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SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: A CONCEPT
IN SEARCH OF CONTENT
UCHI EWELUKWA*
"In a few years it will be our people that will be masters, it will be our
commerce that will prevail, it will be our capital that will rule .... You
must enable it to get to the country where its work is to be done. You must
open the path. "1
- Lord Salisbury of Great Britain (1895)
The majority of WTO members are developing countries. We seek to
place their needs and interests at the heart of the World program adopted
in this Declaration .... We are committed to addressing the
marginalization of least-developed countries in international trade ......
- The Doha Ministerial Declaration (2001)
"Let me put it as plainly as I can: we want to be selling our beef and
our corn and our beans to people around the world who need to eat. My
administration is working hard to open up markets."
- President George Bush (2002)
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception more than fifty years ago, 2 the multilateral trading
system(MTS) 3 has been at the center of debates about the relationship
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law - Fayetteville; Fellow,
Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs (2003-2004); S.J.D. 2003, Harvard
University. The University of Arkansas School of Law has supported the work with summer
research grant in 2002.
1. See M.H. Y. Kaniki, The Colonial Economy: The Former British Zones, in GENERAL
HISTORY OF AFRICA VII: AFRICA UNDER COLONIAL DOMINATION 1880-1935, 383 (A. Adu
Boahen ed., 1985).
2. An abundant of literature exist on the historical origins of the multilateral trading system
generally and on the history and development of the GATT/WTO over the last five decades.' See
generally W. Diebold, THE END OF THE WTO (1952); G. Curzon, MULTILATERAL COMMERCIAL
DIPLOMACY (1965); R. E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY
(1975); R. E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
MODERN GATr LEGAL SYSTEM (1991); J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE
GATT (1969); J. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (1996); RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL
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between trade and development, the nature of international trade policies
that is appropriate for development and the overall status of developing
countries in the global trading system. 4 A significant question that has
plagued the system is whether, in fashioning global trade rules, the eco-
nomic differences between developed and developing countries should be
recognized and the special challenges developing countries face taken into
consideration. 5 In other words, should the obligations of developing coun-
tries differ from those of developed countries on account of their lower
levels of development? And, to the extent that it is agreed that the obli-
gations of developing countries should differ from those of developed
countries, how can this be achieved without completely undermining the
fundamental principles that underpin the MTS, such as the principles of
non-discrimination and reciprocity?
At first glance, global trade rules make a distinction between developed
and developing countries, 6 and they do appear to recognize the special
TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 127-141 (2d. ed., 2001) (accounting the development of the
GAT-WTO system).
3. The Dictionary of Trade Policy Terms defines multiculturalism in the context of global
trade as "an approach to the conduct of international trade based on cooperation, equal rights and
obligations, non-discrimination and participation as equals of many countries regardless of their
size or share of international trade." DICTIONARY OF TRADE POLICY TERMS 187 (2nd ed. 1998);
see also Inaamul Haque, Reflections on the WTO Doha Ministerial: Doha Development Agenda:
Recapturing the Momentum of Multiculturalism and Developing Countries, 17 AM. U. INT'L L.
REV. 1097, 1102 (noting that multiculturalism is an approach anchored in a philosophy of
cooperation, equity, and non-discrimination.).
4. See generally Edward Goldsmith, Development as Colonialism, in THE CASE AGAINST
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 253-266 (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith ed., 1996) (arguing that
development and colonialism are the same process under different names, and also questioning the
premise that free trade involves competition on "a level playing field"). According to him, just as
the colonial economies were committed to destroying the domestic economies of the countries
they had colonized, proponents of free trade have the same goal today-to pry open and destroy
the economies of developing countries. Id. But see P.T. BAUER, EQUALITY, THE THIRD WORLD
AND ECONOMIC DELUSION 76-80 (1981) (arguing that the poorest areas of the Third World have
no external trade and that the causes of their backwardness are domestic and cannot be blamed on
the structure of global trade arrangements).
5. There is no definition of "developed" and "developing" countries in the multilateral trade
agreements. Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) decide for themselves whether
they are "developed" or "developing." See WTO, Who are the developing countries in the WTO?
(last visited May 30, 2003) available at www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dlwho-e.htm; see also
The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and the International
Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Development Since the Fourth WTO Ministerial
Conference, DOHA ROUND BRIEFING SERIES, Vol. 1, No. 13 at 1 (Feb. 2003) (noting that one of
the most contentious issues to face the MTS is the debate over differentiated rights and obligations
between developed and developing countries) [hereinafter DOHA ROUND BRIEFING SERIES]
6. The preamble of numerous multilateral trade agreements contain references committing
the WTO and WTO members to implement trade rules in ways that take into account the interests
of developing countries. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/doc-e/legal e/04-wto.doc ("Recognizing further that there is need for
positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least developed
among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of
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vulnerability of countries at lower levels of development and the need to
fashion appropriate policies that are inclusive and that would ensure the full
integration of these countries into the global trading system. 7 However, a
closer look at the substantive and procedural rules of the system as they
have evolved in the last fifty years suggests apathy, a lack of serious com-
mitment to develop rules that would benefit poor countries, and a tendency
towards exclusivity rather than inclusiveness. 8
In response to serious concerns that arose during the decolonization
period of the 1950s and 1960s about the fate of newly independent
countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, some effort was made to
fashion trade rules that were sensitive to the vulnerable situation of these
countries;9 the concept of special and differential treatment (S&DT) emer-
ged and encapsulated the totality of the responses to the development
concerns within the MTS.0 S&DT, thus, refers to the set of trade policies
pursued within the MTS to address the complex challenges of
their economic development"). S e e Agreement on Agriculture, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legale/14-agO l e.htm (stating, "Having agreed that in
implementing their commitments on market access, developed country Members would take fully
into account the particular needs and conditions of developing country Members by providing for
a greater improvement of opportunities and terms of access for agricultural products of particular
interest to these Members, including the fullest liberalization of trade in tropical agricultural
products as agreed at the Mid-Term Review, and for products of particular importance to the
diversification of production from the growing of illicit narcotic crops.") (emphasis added); see
also Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal_el8-trims-e.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2004)
[hereinafter Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures] ("Taking into account the
particular trade, development and financial needs of developing country Members, particularly
those of the least-developed country Members.") (emphasis added).
7. See generally Constantine Michalopoulos, Trade and Development in the GATT and the
WTO: The Role of Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries, 18 (April 19,
2000) (noting the fact that WTO agreements contain provisions that call on Members to take into
account the needs and interest of developing countries and least developed countries) (on file with
author).
8. William Kerr, A Club No More - The WTO after Doha, 3 THE ESTEY CENTRE J. INT'L L.
& TRADE POL'Y 1, 1 (arguing that since its inception, the GATT and its successor the WTO have
been able to operate in a manner that is more consistent with a club that an inclusive organization
that encouraged the active participation of all its members); see also Thomas MacBride,
Rejuvenating the WTO: Why the U.S. Must Assist Developing Countries in Trade Disputes, I 1
INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 65, 69 (Spring, 1999) (noting that many critics have accused developed
nations of manipulating global trade rules to its sole benefits, with little regard for the needs of
developing countries).
9. Of the original twenty-three signatories of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1947 (GATT), eleven were developing countries. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
10. Amar Breckenridge, Developing an Issues-Based Approach to Special and Differential
Treatment at 3, available at www.iadb.org/int/DRP/ing/Redl/tradedocument3.htm (last visited
Feb. 27, 2004) (noting that although the WTO's development dimension is not reducible to SDT,
questions relating to SDT have occupied a large part of development discourse).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
development" and to respond to the inequitable distribution of wealth
among participants in the system.12 "It was conceived in acknowledgement
of the fact that developing countries [were] at ... very different stages of
economic, financial and technological developments and therefore [had]
entirely different capacities as compared to developed countries in taking on
multilateral commitments and obligations." 13 Although the practice of ac-
cording special treatment to developing countries goes back at least to
1955,14 the term "special and more favourable" treatment first appeared in
the 1979 Tokyo Round Decision.15 Since its introduction into international
trade discourse, the concept of SDT has evolved through successive trade
rounds' 6 and has undergone series of changes as membership in the MTS
changed to admit more developing countries, as views about the importance
of free trade and the relationship between trade and development changed,
and as the institutional landscape of the global trading system changed.
Fifty years after the creation of the MTS, the meaning, scope, and
content of the S&DT provisions of multilateral trade agreements are still
very much debated and serious implementation problems plague even those
11. JOHN WHALLEY, SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN THE MILLENNIUM
ROUND, (Centre for the Study of Globalization and Regionalization, Working Paper No. 30,
1999); see also WTO/CTD Special Session, Special and Differential Treatment Provisions: Joint
Communication from the African Group in the WTO, TN/CTD/W/3/Rev. 2 (July 17, 2002)
(stating, "Special and differential treatment is a core principle of the WTO framework, and is to be
distinguished from that generally available under the WTO agreement to other members. It is
accorded exclusively to developing and least developed countries").
12. Peter Lichtenbaum, Reflections on the WTO Doha Ministerial: "Special Treatment"
vs. "Equal Participation:" Striking a Balance in the Doha Negotiations, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1003, 1007 (2002) (noting that the principle of S&DT has been the traditional approach of the
MTS to address inequitable distribution of wealth among its members).
13. World Trade Organization/General Council, Preparations for the Fourth Session of the
Ministerial Conference: Proposal for a Framework Agreement on Special and Differential
Treatment, para. 1, WT/GC/W/442 (Sept. 19, 2001) [hereinafter Proposal for a Framework
Agreement].
14. The idea of SDT could be traced further back to the 1947 Havana Conference during
which attempts were made to address issues pertaining to development. See Text of the Charter
for An International Trade Organization (March 24, 1948) in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW HANDBOOK 83 (2d ed., 2001); see also Hesham Youssef, Special and Differential
Treatment for Developing Countries in the WTO (undated; on file with the author) (noting that
although the term SDT is of fairly recent origin, the idea is more than half a century old).
15. See Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203-05
(1980).
16. Multilateral trade negotiations have traditionally occurred in sets known as "rounds." In
the history of the multilateral system, there have been a total of nine rounds (eight during the
GATT era and one since the establishment of the WTO). During the GATT era, the following
occurred: the original GATI negotiation (mid to late 1940s), the Annecy Round (1948-1949), The
Torquay Round (1950-51), The Geneva Round (1955-1956), The Dillion Round (1960-1962), The
Kennedy Round (1964-1967), the Tokyo Round (1973-1979), and the Uruguay Round (1986-
1994). Since 1994, only one round has been launched, the Doha Round in 2001. BHALA, supra
note 2, at 132-33.
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provisions that appear to be unambiguous. One reason for this is that the
idea of S&DT collides with another core principle of international eco-
nomic law-the principle of non-discrimination embodied in the Most
Favoured Nation (MFN) clause.' 7 Confusion also arises as a result of the
presence of a series of unresolved ambiguities that underlie the MTS and
that together provide continuing tensions that the MTS must always attempt
to balance. Peter M. Gerhart identifies three such ambiguities:18
(i) ambiguity regarding whether the GATTIWTO system is a rule-based or
an outcome-based system,19 (ii) ambiguity regarding whether reciprocity in
the MTS means equal opportunity or equal benefits, 20 and (iii) ambiguity
evident in the reverence for certainty and an allegiance to flexibility in the
MTS.21
Traditional S&DT was based on the recognition that developing
countries faced conditions that were different from the conditions in de-
veloped countries and that these conditions required that developing
countries be treated differently in the MTS. As a result, the basic content of
S&DT provisions had three main components: (i) better market access for
products from developing countries so they could boost economic
development through exports; 22 (ii) a lower level of obligation for
developing countries, providing them with necessary flexibility to protect
their markets and pursue policy options appropriate for development and
17. The preamble to the original GATT stressed the importance of eliminating discriminatory
treatment in international commerce and emphasized the importance of "reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements" directed towards the substantial reduction of tariffs. See GATT. The
principle of non-discrimination is also firmly entrenched in Article 1 (Most Favored Nation
clause) and Article 3 (National Treatment clause) of GATT. Lichtenbaum, supra note 12, at 1007.
18. See generally Peter M. Gerhart, Reflections on the WTO DOHA Ministerial: Slow
Transformation: The WTO as a Distributive Organization, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1045, 1053
(2002).
19. Id. at 1055-57 (noting that one image of the VTO (the rule-based image) is that the WTO
is simply designed to let member countries set up rules for the global market, without any
particular interest in the effects of the rules on determining winners and rulers.) The problem,
however, is that members of the WTO are not interested in rules but are interested in results; most
buy into the rules only because the rules promises pay-offs for the members.
20. Id. at 1060 (explaining that although the WTO negotiations demand reciprocal benefits,
the principle of reciprocity is ambiguous.) The author asks:
Does reciprocity mean ... that every country must benefit, or that every country must
benefit equally? And if reciprocity demands that benefits be equal, how should
equality be measured? And does reciprocity mean every country must benefit in terms
of the expected outcomes of the negotiation, or, instead, in terms of the actual outcome
of the negotiations?" To Gerhart, the concept of reciprocity is confusing largely
because there is no external monitor of the negotiating process to determine whether
the reciprocity requirement has been met.
21. Id. at 1063 (noting although the WTO purposes to be a rule-based system, virtually every
WTO obligation is matched with at least one exception, oftentimes many).
22. Proposal for a Framework Agreement, at para. 5.
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industrialization; 23 and (iii) broad exemptions from various GATT
agreements. 24 Today, the premise for S&DT is shifting. The focus appears
to be no longer on the special problems of development, but rather on the
problems that developing countries may face implementing the multilateral
trade agreements; the understanding is that all members of the MTS should
be treated equally and that the level of development had no relationship
with the level of rights and obligations under the MTS.25
Given what developing countries perceive to be an be an erosion of
S&DT,26 serious questions thus arise regarding the continued usefulness of
the concept of SDT as an analytical tool and the effectiveness of SDT
provisions in existing trade agreements.27 For example: what set of rules,
policies, and practices are required to ensure effective integration of de-
veloping countries in the MTS? What are the present obstacles to the
emergence of a development-enhancing set of trade rules and policies?
What contributions can global trade rules make to development? Is it
possible to come up with a new framework for S&DT that can guide
meaningful negotiations in the future?28 In the final analysis, is the concept
of S&DT one whose time has come and gone and that must be quickly
buried, or is it one whose true potential is yet to be fully maximized through
careful refinement and fine-tuning?
Discussions about S&DT are timely and extremely important for at
least six reasons. First, in the last five decades global trade has assumed
increased significance for most countries and has expanded rapidly. 29 Since
1947, multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs) have involved an ever-
increasing number of countries (23 in 1947 compared to 118 in 1986) and
have covered a greater dollar value of world trade ($3.7 trillion in 1986).30
Second, since 1947, the liberalization commitments of developing countries
have deepened, in part as a result of the single-undertaking approach of the
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at para. 7.
26. Id. at paras. 7-9 (noting that the "dramatic erosion" of S&DT in the Uruguay Round
Agreements because the Uruguay Round Agreements shifted the thrust from enhanced market
opportunities to peripheral issues, such as grant of transition periods and technical assistance).
27. Today, numerous questions are still on the table. For example: What is the link between
the WTO, trade, and development? Is the WTO delivering in terms of fully integrating developing
countries into the MTS and ensuring that they benefit from trade? Is there a continuing need to
redress imbalances in the MTS in other to ensure that developing countries benefit from trade?
What aspects of the rules governing the MTS (substantive as well as procedural) still beg for
reform?
28. WHALLEY, supra note 11, at 2.
29. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WORLD TRADE REPORT 118 (2002) [hereinafter
WORLD TRADE REPORT].
30. Id. at 133.
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Uruguay Round, making their economies much more vulnerable to external
pressures. 31 Third, the agenda of the MTS is much wider and the scope of
competence of the GATT/WTO is much broader now than it was fifty years
ago;32 many new sectors (e.g., intellectual property, services, tele-
communication) are now increasingly covered by global trade agreements,
and in these areas, domestic policies are increasingly constrained. 33 Fourth,
it would appear that for some developing countries, not only has trade not
contributed to national development, but trade may be threatening the lives
of the most vulnerable members of the society. Fifth, although the MTS
involves an ever-increasing number of developing countries, 34 there re-
mains a perception that the agenda of the GATT/WTO is driven by
developed countries. 35 Arguably, the future legitimacy of the WTO may
hinge of the extent to which it addresses the needs and concerns of its de-
veloping country members. Finally, the presence of a strong dispute settle-
ment process now means that developing countries cannot afford to
willfully violate global trade rules even when forced by domestic economic
conditions. 36 Overall, as a result of their depth and reach and the presence
31. Id. at 119. "The single undertaking brought many new obligations and a much deeper
level of involvement in the system on the part of developing countries." Id.
32. The expansion of the agenda was a direct result of the Uruguay Round. The outcome of
the Uruguay Round was that many old rules were strengthened and many new areas were covered.
GATT was created by virtue of "the Protocol of Provisional Application of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade" that was adopted on October 30, 1947. GATT was only
intended as a provisional legal document but remained in force until January 1, 1995. In
discussing GATT, it is important to remember that GATT originated as both the "constitution of
international trade law" and the dominant multilateral trade institution. BHALA, supra note 2, at
127.
The World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor to the General Agreement on Tariff and
Trade (GATT), came into existence on January 1, 1995. See Uruguay Round Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (April 15, 1994) in BHALA, supra note 14, at 273-85;
see also The World Trade Organization Home page http://www.wto.org [hereinafter WTO Home
page]; Andreas F. Lowenfield, Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in the New
GATT, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 477, 477 (1994).
33. DOHA ROUND BRIEFING SERIES, supra note 5, at 1 (noting that developing countries
accepted binding discipline in areas that were once optional. They also took on new obligations
that were once considered non-trade issues). Proposal for a Framework Agreement, at para. 8
(noting that the erosion of S&DT was compounded by the fact that the WTO agreements went
beyond the traditional border measures covered under the GATT and included many more areas of
domestic economic policy making).
34. WORLD TRADE REPORT, supra note 29, at 118 (noting that the increased membership in
the WTO in recent years has been accounted for entirely by developing countries and countries in
transition); see also World Trade Report, The Doha Development Agenda and the Participation of
Least-Developed Countries, para. 38, WT/COMTD/LDC/INF/l, (May 28, 2003) (noting that
least-developed countries as a group account for more than a fifth of the WTO membership).
35. WORLD TRADE REPORT, supra note 29, at 119 (stating, "Most initiatives aimed at
expanding the GATT/WTO's work program and negotiating mandates have emanated from
developed countries").
36. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1125
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of a strong dispute settlement mechanism, multilateral trade agreements
have much wider implications for a country's economy today than they did
fifty years ago.
This article reviews the concept of S&DT against the backdrop of
growing concerns that developing countries as a group have not benefited
from the MTS despite the existence of over 100 S&DT provisions in the
multilateral trade agreements, 37 but they have seen their share of global
trade stagnate or decline. The concept of S&DT is also examined against
the backdrop of growing concerns, in some quarters, that S&DT is an in-
effective approach to the development question. This article is in four
sections.
In Section I, I examine the core elements of the development
dimension of the MTS since its inception. Essentially, I shall try to map out
the critical phases in the evolution in the thinking about S&DT and examine
continuities and changes in the S&DT provisions of multilateral trade
agreements. I shall examine two stages in this development. First, I shall
examine the development of the concept of S&DT from about 1947 to 1986
(the pre-Uruguay Round period). Second, I shall examine the development
of the concept froml986 to 2001 (the Uruguay Round period). 38 While
S&DT in the pre-Uruguay Round period called for special treatment for
developing countries and emphasized granting preferential market access
for developing countries export and lessening the level of obligation for
developing countries, thus providing them with the flexibility to pursue
economic development goals, a critical change occurred in the course of the
Uruguay Round. In the Uruguay Round, there was a new emphasis on
equal participation by developing countries coupled with time flexibilities
and promises of technical assistance.
(1994); see also MacBride, supra note 8, at 68 ( stating that "the WTO agreement created a more
potent dispute settlement process than had existed previously); Claudio Cocuzza & Andrea
Forabosco, Are States Relinquishing Their Sovereign Rights? The GATT Dispute Settlement
Process in a Globalized Economy, 4 TUL. J. OF INT'L & COMP. L. 161 (1996).
37. See A.V. Ganesan, Seattle and Beyond: Developing-Country Perspectives, in THE WTO
AFTER SEATTLE 85, 85-86 (Jeffery J. Schott, ed., 2000) (discussing the concerns of developing
countries with the MTS). He identifies three major concerns. First, developing countries
"perceive that the system is becoming less fair and more inequitable as the needs and concerns of
the developing countries fail to receive the attention they deserve." Second, developing countries
are concerned that "the trade agenda is being expanded to incorporate only issues in which
developed countries are interested." Third, developing countries believe that the rules governing
the MTS "are increasingly becoming a codification of developed-country policies, laws, and
regulations". See Proposal for a Framework Agreement, at para. 9 (expressing concern that
developing countries can hardly benefit from the almost 145 S&DT provisions in the Uruguay
Agreements in part because most do not go beyond best endeavour promise).
38. WORLD TRADE REPORT, supra note 29, at 152.
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In Section II, I shall examine the current concerns about S&DT.
Today, developing and developed countries alike express dissatisfaction
with the concept and application of S&DT. In July 2001, for example,
deeply concerned about their role in the WTO, a group of twelve de-
veloping countries called for a new Framework Agreement on Special and
Differential Treatment which should include provisions reflecting the ob-
jectives and principles of S&DT for developing countries. 39 I shall attempt
to examine the reasons advanced for the growing dissatisfaction with the
concept of S&DT as it currently stands, look at the conceptual justifications
for S&DT, and also examine core arguments advanced for and against the
continuing application of the concept of S&DT in the global trading system.
In Section III, I shall focus on the Doha Ministerial Declaration of
2001, adopted at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar,40 and its
approach to S&DT and development more generally (the Doha
Development Agenda). In the Doha Declaration, noting that "[i]nter-
national trade can play a major role in the promotion of economic
development and the alleviation of poverty," 41 and that the majority of
WTO members are developing countries, WTO members agreed to
"continue to make positive efforts designed to ensure that developing
countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in
the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development." 42 Members also expressed commitment to "addressing the
marginalization of least-developed countries in international trade and to
improving their effective participation in the multilateral trading system."43
With respect to S&DT, WTO members agreed specifically that "all special
and differential treatment provisions shall be reviewed with a view to
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and
operational.'"44  The Doha Declaration held many promises for the
revitalization and clarification of the concept of S&DT. Sadly, despite the
many promises of the Doha Development Agenda, negotiations have
ground to a halt. I shall review the developments that have occurred since
the 2001 Ministerial Conference in Doha and explore the reasons for the
current impasse in S&DT negotiations.
39. Proposal for a Framework Agreement, at para. 14.
40. See Doha Ministerial Declaration (Nov. 14, 2001), WT/MIN (01)/Dec/W/1, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/ministe/min0l1e/mindecl_e.htm (last visited April 13,
2004) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial Declaration].
41. Id. at para. 2.
42. Id.
43. Id. at para. 3
44. Id. at para. 44 (emphasis added).
2003]
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In Section IV, I attempt to identify the thorny issues that have to be
addressed if progress is to be made in future negotiations on S&DT. I offer
some suggestions on how a new framework for S&DT may be worked out
taking into account the development needs of developing countries on the
one hand and the need to preserve the integrity of the MTS as a whole on
the other. I argue that if indeed the WTO has begun to transform itself
"from an organization whose central value is efficiency to one that also
considers global distributive issues," 45 it must take the concerns of de-
veloping countries and least developing countries (LDCs) more seriously.
Successful global economic integration in the MTS requires a lot more than
sound rules for the market and exclusive focus on wealth creation; it also
requires mechanisms to redistribute wealth, alleviate poverty, and promote
sound and coherent economic development in poor countries.
Changed global economic conditions and the changing needs of
developing countries however requires that the concept of S&DT be refined
to ensure that the countries that need it most actually benefit. It is also
important that the obligations and responsibilities of developing countries in
the MTS and with respect to S&DT be clarified. Thus, while the WTO and
the developed countries have a duty to strengthen and operationalize the
S&DT provisions in various WTO agreements, developing countries have a
duty to actually utilize these provisions, to provide clear commitments on
implementation, and to institute meaningful domestic reforms.
The multilateral trading system is here to stay. Institutionally, the
system is stronger now than ever before with the establishment in 1995 of
the WTO. Normatively, the passage of the Uruguay Round Agreements in
1994 represented an important milestone in the history of GATT.46
Moreover, despite continuing internal debates in some countries and de-
bates about the dangers of free trade, policy makers in developing countries
have by and large embraced the global trading system with its emphasis on
45. Gerhart, supra note 18, at 1045.
46. MacBride, supra note 8, at 65 (noting that the passage of the Uruguay Round Agreement
was arguably the most significant development in the GATT's history). The multilateral
agreements on trade in goods exits as an annex to the WTO Agreement. Altogether there are
thirteen agreements that make up the Uruguay Round Agreements on Trade in Goods. These
agreements include the following: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994),
Agreement on Agriculture, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS Agreement), Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC Agreement), Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMS Agreement), Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping or "AD" Agreement), Agreement on Implementation of
Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Custom Valuation Agreement),
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Agreement on Rules of Origin, Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), Agreement on Safeguards, and Agreement on
Import Licensing Procedure. BHALA, supra note 14, at 285-601.
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trade liberalization and deregulation. 47 Concerns however persist over the
status of developing countries in the global trading system.4 8 There are
growing concerns over the widening income gap between developed and
developing countries.4 9 There is also the fear that the promised gains from
trade will never materialize and that greater integration will only lead to the
47. Developing countries have by and large, willingly and/or unwillingly, shown
commitment to liberalizing their trade regimes. This commitment is manifested in various ways
including, membership in the WTO (three quarters of the WTO members are developing
countries), participation in regional trade agreements, and unilateral reforms. See Ambassador
Celso L.N. Amorim, The WTO From the Perspective of a Developing Country, 24 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 95, 95-96 (noting that while a few decades ago many developing countries regarded the
global trading system as fundamentally unfair and adopted a host of interventionist policies, the
situation has changed dramatically in recent years. Most developing countries have become
thriving democracies, have embarked on market reform, and are beginning to discover or
rediscover the value of a rule-based multilateral trading system. Id.; see also Jayashree Watal,
Developing Countries' Interests in a "Development Round" in THE WTO AFrER SEATTLE 71, 71
(Jeffery Schott ed., 2000) (noting that the Uruguay Round marked a watershed in the participation
of developing countries in the multilateral trading system). According to him, "[Flor the first
time, developing country participants chose to strike bargains on the basis of reciprocity. By and
large, they committed themselves to lowered industrial and agricultural tariffs, accepted stringent
disciplines in new areas such as intellectual property, and opened up some of their services sectors
in return for improved and more secure market access for their exports..."). Id.
48. Although every corner of the globe has felt the effects of globalization, the participation
and contributions of the various regions and nations have differed markedly. Judged by the new
standards for measuring globalization, only few developing countries play a substantial role in the
global economy and most contribute mainly on the basis of their environmental and resource
endowment through the export of primary products.
One such standard is the A.T. KearneyFOREIGN POLICY Magazine Globalization Index.
Troubled by contemporary debate over globalization which they describe as "unsatisfactory," A.T.
Kearney, Inc., in association with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, set out to
devise measures to measure levels of interdependence among nations. Their index attempt to offer
answers to three questions: "how do we determine the extent to which a country has become
embedded within the global economy, How do we demonstrate that globalization is racing ahead,
rather than just liming along, and how do we know just how worldwide the World Wide Web has
become?" See A.T. Kearney/FOREIGN POLICY Magazine, Measuring Globalization, FOREIGN
POLICY 5665, Jan./Feb. (2001) available at 2001 WL 11393432.
The A.T. Kearney/FOREIGN POLICY Magazine Globalization Index (the Globalization Index)
quantifies the level of personal contact across national borders, charts the World Wide Web, and
measures economic integration by tracking the movement of goods and services between
countries. Id. Essentially, the Globalization Index looks at technological factors (percentage of
population online, number of Internet hosts per capita, and number of secure servers per capita)
and non-technology factors (trade in goods and services, personal contacts, capital flows). Id.
They conclude that Singapore leads the ranking as the most global nations in the index, followed
by several European countries. Id. The top twenty most globalized countries are: Singapore,
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Ireland, Austria, United Kingdom, Norway, Canada,
Denmark, United States, Italy, Germany, Portugal, France, Hungary, Spain, Israel, and Malaysia.
49. Amorim, supra note 47, at 96 (noting that an analysis of recent data demonstrate beyond
doubt that the global trading system is failing to play a positive role in terms of global income
distribution). He notes that "comparing figures concerning the participation of different groups of
countries in the world trade, from 1994 to 1998, one can verify that the volume of total trade of
the developed countries increased by about 33%, whereas the volume of total trade of the
developing countries increased by only 20%"). See generally OXFAM, RIGGED RULES AND
DOUBLE STANDARDS: TRADE, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY (2002).
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further marginalization of those countries unable to offer or secure
meaningful concessions.
The concept of SDT is in a state of flux. The last fifty years have wit-
nessed changing "consensus on the international trade policies that may be
conducive to development." 50 During this period, the trade policy and
practice of many developing countries also witnessed substantial changes,5'
and the developing country coalition admitted a lot of new members, but
also witnessed the exit of some old members. My goal in this paper is sim-
ply to examine the changing content, meaning, and emphasis of a concept
that originated in response to the needs of developing countries more than
fifty years ago, to identify unresolved questions and tensions in S&DT
debate, and to review the efficacy of S&DT provisions in existing
agreements.
The breakdown of trade talks at the WTO Fifth Ministerial Conference
in Cancun, Mexico 52 points to a growing loss of confidence and
dissatisfaction with the global trade arrangements. The unequal balance of
power between developing and developed countries remains a major
concern. Because of their relative market size, developed countries have
more leverage to shape global trade rules to their advantage. The result is
that despite more than fifty years of S&DT, "the practical experience of
many developing countries that are parties to the GATT has been
disappointing." 53
50. Michalopoulos, supra note 7, at 3.
51. Breckenridge, supra note 10, at 3.
52. The Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference was held in Cancun, Mexico from September 10-
14, 2003. The main task was to take stock of progress in negotiations and other work under the
Doha Development Agenda. See generally World Trade Organization, Fifth Ministerial
Conference, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min03_e/minO3_e.htm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
On September 14, 2004, negotiations in Cancun intended to advance the Doha Development
Agenda broke down unexpectedly when developing countries walked out of trade meetings.
Negotiations broke down along a North-South Divide. Developing countries were unhappy with
the lack of progress on negotiations on agricultural subsidies, market access, and industrial tariffs
and were dissatisfied with the efforts of some developed countries led by the European
Communities to open negotiations on investment and competition rules, trade facilitation, and
transparency in government procurement-the so called "Singapore issues." See generally,
Jagdish Bhagwati, Don't Cry for Canctin FOREIGN AFFAIRS 52-63 (Jan,/Feb. 2004)
53. MacBride, supra note 8, at 69.
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II. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT: THE LAST FIFTY
YEARS
Today, according to the WTO Secretariat, there are at least ninety-
seven S&DT provisions scattered in various Uruguay Round Agreements.5 4
An examination of the origin and development of S&DT provisions reveals
a noticeable difference between the pre-Uruguay round understanding of
the concept and the post-Uruguay round understanding and practice. The
basic problem today is not so much the number of S&DT provisions there
are, but persisting uncertainty regarding the legal status of most of the pro-
visions and the general lack of implementation.
A. PRE-URUGUAY ROUND SDT (1947-1986)
Essentially, S&DT in the pre-Uruguay Round period had three main
prongs: enhanced (preferential) market access to developed country markets
for products originating in the developing world under the Generalized
System of Preferences,5 5 special right of developing countries to adopt mar-
ket protective measures for balance of payment purposes and to shield their
infant industries from foreign competition,56 and exclusion from some
GATT disciplines.
Although eleven out of twenty-three original founding members of
GATT would have been considered developing countries,57 the original
GATT, as negotiated in 1947, did not recognize the special situation of de-
veloping countries. 58 This was not surprising given that MTS rested firmly
54. WTO/Committee on Trade and Development, Concerns Regarding Special and
Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions - Note by the Secretariat,
WT/COMTD/W/66, (Feb. 16, 2000). Although the WTO puts the number at 97, the exact number
is debatable. DOHA ROUND BRIEFING SERIES, supra note 5, at l(noting that there are about 155
provisions). A subsequent report by the WTO put the number of S&DT provisions at 145. See
infra note 114.
55. The special rights of market access are found in those provisions that allow for
preferential market access to goods from developing countries, for example, Article XXV and the
1979 Enabling Clause. Michalopoulos, supra note 7, at 10.
56. The right to protect can be found in those provisions that allow developing countries
some flexibility in order to promote infant industry and address balance of payment problems. Id.
at 10 (noting that the right of protection meant that developing countries did not have to liberalize
trade on a reciprocal basis and they could support their exports through subsidies).
57. See BEVERLY M. CARL, TRADE AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD IN THE 21ST CENTURY
83 (2001). The original GATT had 23 signatories. The eleven countries that would have
qualified as developing countries were: Brazil, China, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon,
Chile, Syria, Northern Rhodesia and Lebanon.
58. The preamble to the original GATT simply recognized that relations amongst Member
States "in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real
income and effective demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding
the production and exchange of goods."
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on the principles of universality (uniformity) of rights and obligations, and
non-discrimination and reciprocity in trade relations; developing countries
did not have much say in the constitutive treaty that birthed GATT.59
GATT was constituted long before the wave of decolonization that took
place in the 1960s and gave birth to the majority of the countries that now
make up the WTO.60 Moreover, in 1947, the priorities and processes of
GATT were determined by the North-a fact that earned GATT its early
reputation as a "rich men's club." 61 In addition, as originally conceived,
GATT was essentially a trade policy forum designed to facilitate reduction
of barriers to trade; it was not designed nor programmed to respond to the
development concerns that developing countries sought to foster upon it.62
Changes gradually began to occur about 1954. Between 1954 and 1986,
four main provisions of GATT and related instruments dealt with special
rights and protection for developing countries. These are: Article XVIII,
Article XXVIIIbis(iii), Part IV of GATT, and the Enabling Clause.
1. Substantive Change
The first major change occurred in 1955 following the 1954-55 Review
Session and came in the form of amendment to Article XVIII entitled
"Governmental Assistance to Economic Development." 63 It was an ac-
knowledgment that developing countries faced serious balance of payment
(BOP) problems and that protection of infant industry was needed to
address this problem. Permissible market protective measures included the
following: quantitative restrictions to trade for BOP purposes, tariff
increases on imports to protect infant industry, and broad flexibility in
59. Kerr, supra note 8, at 2 (noting that the impetus for the institutionalization of
international relations largely arose out of the efforts of a few countries, particularly the United
States, Great Britain, Canada, and a few Dominions in the British Commonwealth). The author
also observed that for a long time the GATT was comprised of a small group of largely developed
countries.
60. Id.
61. Youssef, supra note 14, at 1 (noting that in the beginning the concerns and needs of the
emerging developing world were little more than an after thought and were hardly addressed).
Kerr, supra note 8, at 2-3 (observing that in 1947 and for a long time, GATT was comprised of a
small group of largely developed countries and these countries essentially controlled entry into the
organization). The result was that "while the GATT was multilateral in that all countries were
encouraged to join, conditions of membership were restrictive and the accession process far from
assured." Id.
62. Youssef, supra note 14, at 1. "GATT was not geared to respond to developing countries'
needs and demands for a comprehensive trade agenda, or to grand special status and treatment for
countries at lower levels of development." Id.
63. Article XVIII of GATT deals with Balance-of-Payment (BOP) difficulties. GATT
specified two different sets of rules to govern import restrictions by Contracting Parties for BOP
purposes. While Article XII can be invoked by any member, only developing countries can make
use of Article XVIII. Youssef, supra note 14, at 5.
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policy options. The word "developing country" did not appear in the
amendment; rather, reference was made to contracting parties the eco-
nomies of which "can only support low standards of living" and "are in the
early stages of development." 64 The Contracting Parties recognized that in
order to promote the establishment of particular industry to raise general
standard of living, designated countries might be allowed to maintain
flexibility in their tariff structure and to apply quantitative restriction for
balance of payment purposes. 65 Specifically, the revision allowed des-
ignated countries to withdraw or modify negotiated concessions if the party
considers it desirable "in order to promote the establishment of a particular
industry" with a view to raising the general standard of living of its
people,66 and it relaxed the conditions developing countries had to satisfy in
order to impose import quotas under Article XVIII(B).67 Also, in 1955, the
reciprocity requirement relating to tariff negotiations was eased with the
adoption of Article XXVIII(bis) of GATT.68 The 1955 review session,
however, failed to address a number of issues important to developing
countries, such as the issue of agricultural protectionism in developed
countries, low export earnings, and wide fluctuations in the prices of
commodity products. 69 Some of these issues were taken up in the twelfth
session of the GATT Contracting Parties in 1957 and as a result, a panel of
experts was established to examine trends in international trade.70
64. GATT, Article XVIII(l).
65. GATT, Article XVIII(2).
66. GATT, Article XVIII(A). The Article provided detailed procedure that a country
wishing to avail itself of the benefits of the Article must follow; such a party was obliged to notify
other GATT contracting parties of their intent and to enter into negotiation with any contracting
party with which such concession was initially negotiated and with other contracting parties that
have substantial interest in the concessions.
67. GATT, Article XVIII(B). This was in recognition that countries in the early stages of
development experienced balance of payment difficulties when they are in rapid process of
development arising from efforts to expand their internal market and from the instability in their
terms of trade. The revision allowed such countries to control the general levels of their imports
by restricting quantity and/or values of imports. CARL, supra note 57, at 82.
68. While noting that custom duties often constitute serious obstacle to trade and that
negotiations "on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis" directed to the substantial
reduction of the general level of tariffs was needed, the Article provides that negotiations shall be
conducted on a basis which affords adequate opportunity to take into account "the needs of less-
developed countries for a more flexible use of tariff protection to assist their economic
development and special needs of these countries to maintain tariffs for revenue purposes." CARL,
supra note 57, at 83.
69. M. RAFIQUL, ISLAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 442-43 (1999) (noting that the 1954-
55 Review Session "failed to address a number of discriminatory issues, including the pressing ill-
effect of disposal/liquidation of agricultural surpluses due to ... opposition to include agriculture
in the GATT trade liberalization agenda).
70. WORLD TRADE REPORT, supra note 29, at 152.
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In 1964, Part IV, entitled "Trade and Development" and comprising
three new Articles-XXXVI, XXXVII and XXXVIII-was added to
GATT. Part IV emphasized the need for preferential market access for
goods from developing countries and essentially called for lower tariff rates
on products originating in a developing country and destined for developed
countries' markets.7 ' Part IV was a recognition by GATT contracting
parties that trade and development were inextricably intertwined and a
concomitant willingness to address development issues within an inter-
national trade regime. 72 In Article XXXVI, contracting parties agreed that
there was a "need for a rapid and sustained expansion of the export earnings
of the less-developed contracting parties," 73 a need "for positive efforts
designed to ensure that less-developed contracting parties secure a share in
the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development,"7 4 and a need "to provide in the largest possible
measure more favourable and acceptable conditions of access to world
markets" for primary products of less-developed countries, given these
countries dependence on the exportation of a limited range of these
products. 75 Additionally, under Article XXXVI, contracting parties recog-
nized a need for "increased access ... to markets under favourable
conditions ... for processed and manufactured products ... of particular
interests to less-developed contracting parties." 76 The Article also formally
recognized the concept of non-reciprocity. 77
To give effect to Article XXXVI, developed contracting parties of
GATT agreed to "accord high priority to the reduction and elimination of
barriers to products ... of particular export interest to less-developed
71. Lichtenbaum, supra note 12, at 1012.
72. In Article XXXVI(1) of GATT, for example, contracting parties recalled that the basic
objective of the Agreement "include the raising of standards of living and the progressive
development of the economies of all contracting parties." They noted that "export earnings of the
less-developed contracting parties can play a vital part in their economic development and that the
extent of this contribution depends on the prices paid by the less-developed contracting parties for
essential imports, the volume of their exports, and the prices received for these exports." They
also recognized that international trade as a "means of achieving economic and social
advancement should be governed by such rules and procedures ... as are consistent with the
objectives set forth in this Article."
73. GATT, Article XXXVI(2).
74. GATT, Article XXXVI(3).
75. GATT, Article XXXVI(4).
76. GAT'T, Article XXXVI(5).
77. GATT, Article XXXVI(8). "The developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity
for commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers
to the trade of less-developed contracting parties." Id. The idea, as reflected in an interpretive
note, was that less-developed countries "should not be expected" to make concessions in the
course of trade negotiations that are "inconsistent with their individual development, trade and
financial needs, taking into account past trade developments." Id.
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contracting parties," 78 "refrain from introducing, or increasing the incidence
of, customs duties or non-tariff import barriers on products ... of particular
export interest to less-developed contracting parties," 79 and to "refrain from
imposing new fiscal measures ... which would hamper, or which hamper,
significantly the growth of consumption of primary products, in raw or
processed form ... produced in the territories of less-developed contracting
parties."80 Article XXXVIII approved the principles and objectives for
granting trade preferences to products from developing countries. The
broad principles included, increasing export earnings of developing
countries, promoting industrialization in developing countries, and ac-
celerating economic growth in developing countries.
Part IV "opened the door for preferential treatment of developing
countries in international trade rules" 8' and "provided some flexibility in
relation to the notion of strict reciprocity" by firmly asserting the principle
of non-reciprocity. 82 Despite its laudable objectives, Part IV did not legally
bind members to any concrete actions for accomplishing stated objectives. 83
Moreover, although Part IV asserted the principle of non-reciprocity, the
exact meaning of the term was never too clear.84 Non-reciprocity appeared
to mean that in the course of trade negotiations, developing countries would
generally not be expected to make contributions inconsistent with their in-
dividual needs. Yet, as the World Trade Report 2003 rightly notes, just like
the concept of S&D, "a definition of reciprocity or its inverse has eluded
the precision that might have avoided some of the debates which continues
to dominate the discussions of developing countries participating in the
trading system."85
In 1971, GATT approved the Generalized Preference Scheme (GSP)
in response to the continued pressure from developing countries for
78. GATT, Article XXXVII(l)(a). Essentially, developing countries undertook to take
specific measures to improve the export prospects of developing countries in developed countries'
markets.
79. GATT, Article XXXVII (1)(b).
80. GATT, Article XXXVII(l)(c)(i).
81. GATT, Article XXXVII(l)(c)(2).
82. Youssef, supra note 14, at 1.
83. CARL, supra note 57, at 83 (noting that "although Article XXXVII is entitled,
"Commitments" and repeatedly uses the word "shall" such a term is always qualified by phrases,
such as "to the ... extent possible," "give active consideration," "make every effort," and "have
special regard to"); see also Youssef, supra note 14, at 6 (noting that Article XXXVII is not
enforceable through the dispute settlement process).
84. WORLD TRADE REPORT, supra note 29, at 153.
85. Id. at 153.
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reform. 86 The GSP was designed to allow developed countries to accord
preferential treatment to developing countries without violating the Most
Favoured Nation Clause (MFN) of Article 1 of GATT,87 and it operated as
a waiver under Article XXV (5) of GATT.88 Under this authority, de-
veloped countries that were members of GATT merely waived their rights
to MFN treatment. The GSP scheme as initially construed was a temporary
measure and operated on a voluntary basis. The decision whether and or
not to grant any special and preferential treatment was left to the discretion
of each contracting party; not surprisingly, application was uneven. The
legal basis for the waiver obligation was also very questionable. This was
because Article XXV(5) called for exceptional circumstances; while the
GSP applied to a large number of developing countries and did not call for
a showing of exceptional circumstances. 89
The Tokyo Round (1973-1979)90 led to the adoption of the Decision on
Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries (the Enabling Clause) on November
28, 1979.91 The Enabling Clause provided a permanent legal basis for
S&DT under GATT agreements, provided for certain aspects of regional or
global preferential agreements among developing countries, 92 and provided
a legal basis for the continuation of Generalized System of Preferences. 93
86. Waiver for Generalized System of Preferences, GATT Doc. L/3545 (1971), reprinted in
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 24 (18th Supp. 1972).
87. Under the waiver agreement, contracting parties agreed to (i) to waive provisions of
Article I (Most-Favored Nation Clause) for ten years to the extent necessary to permit developed
countries to accord preferential tariff treatment to products that originate in developing countries
without being bound to extend the same treatment to like products of other contracting parties.
Contracting parties wishing to introduce a preferential tariff arrangement or to modify such an
arrangement were obliged to notify other contracting parties and provide "all useful information"
relating to the action taken.
88. GATT, Article XXV (5) provides that "in exceptional circumstances .... The
Contracting Parties may waive an obligation upon a contracting party by this Agreement."
89. CARL, supra note 57, at 84 (noting that "technically, the legal basis for these waivers was
questionable since Article XXV, called for 'exceptional circumstances,' which seems inconsistent
with the concept of a 'generalized scheme"'); see also BHALA, supra note 2, at 139.
90. The Tokyo Round lasted from 1973 to 1979 and involved 102 countries and about $300
billion of trade. BHALA, supra note 14, at 133.
91. Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries (the Enabling Clause) GATT Doc. L/4903 (Dec. 3, 1979);
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) 203-18 (1980).
92. The Enabling Clause exempt developing countries from the requirements of Article
XXIV of GATT. Id. This meant that developing countries could exchange trade preferences
among themselves without extending this treatment to all GATT members on a most favored
nation basis.
93. BHALA, supra note 2, at 139 (noting that until the Tokyo Round, the legal basis for GSP
treatment had been a waiver of GATT obligations like the MFN treatment). The Enabling Clause
stated that Contracting Parties may accord "differential and more favorable treatment to
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The Enabling Clause also called for more favorable treatment for de-
veloping countries in other GATT agreements and for special treatment for
the least developed developing country. 94
2. Institutional Changes
Institutionally, several changes occurred between 1947 and 1986
including, the establishment of the Committee on Trade and Development
in 1964,95 the establishment of the International Trade Centre also in
1964,96 and the Establishment of Working Group on Preferences in 1965, a
creation of the Committee on Trade and Development.97 On a different
front, the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in
1964 led to the creation of UNCTAD, an organization that was instrumental
in injecting development concerns into the global trading system, at least in
the early days.98
In conclusion, between 1947 and 1986, the MTS witnessed significant
evolution in thinking about the relationship between trade and development
and changes in the substantive provisions of GATT pertaining to de-
veloping countries. SDT during this period focused on two core areas:
preferential access for products from developing countries and right of
protection. Preferential market access was considered a necessary response
to the inequality of consumer markets among GATT members.99 Equally,
"[m]embers considered the introduction of temporary restrictions, under
which developing countries could protect their economy and engage in
economic growth, as politically and economically necessary."100 Both
prongs were anchored in the tacit understanding that the principle non-
developing countries, without according same treatment to other contracting parties,
notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of GATT.
94. CARL, supra note 57, at 85-86.
95. Committee on Trade and Development, GATT B.I.S.D. (13th Supp.) at 75 (1965).
According to its term of reference, the Committee on Trade and Development had the
responsibility to keep under continuous review the application of the provisions of Part IV of
GATT, to formulate proposals for the furtherance of Part IV and consider modifications or
additions thereto, and to consider questions pertaining to the eligibility of contracting parties to be
considered as less-developed contracting parties.
96. International Trade Centre, GAIT B.I.S.D. (12th Supp.) at 124 (1964). The aim of the
ITC was to develop effective trade promotion programs in developing countries and transition
economies.
97. BISD, 13'b Suppl, 1965, p. 86. According to its term of reference, the Working Group had
the responsibility to examine proposals submitted for the extension of preferences to less-
developed countries by developed countries and also to findings of the Working Group on the
Expansion of Trade among less-developed countries with regards to the exchange of preferences.
98. Michalopoulos, supra note 7, at 2 (observing that UNCTAD became the main institution
through which developing countries tried to pursue their international trade agenda in the 1960s).
99. Lichtenbaum, supra note 12, at 1008.
100. Id.
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reciprocity or "less-than full reciprocity in concessions and com-
mitments"lOl was needed if developing countries were to realize their
development goals.
The basic trust of the various reforms was to give developing countries
room to promote their national development goals, to provide flexibility in
relation to the notion of strict reciprocity, and to afford them a chance to
gain improved market access to developed countries' markets despite their
weak bargaining position.102 For most developing countries, however, the
gains were marginal at best. The exact content, scope, and legal status of
the SDT provisions were not altogether clear. As Constantine
Michalopoulos rightly observed, the "GSP turned out less than it was touted
to be at its inception,"103 and despite the ample flexibilities, it was evident
that "all was not well in the international trade rules governing developing
country trade."' 04
B. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT UNDER THE URUGUAY
ROUND AGREEMENTS (1986-1994)
The Uruguay Round negotiations0 5 brought many changes to
substantive provisions of GATT agreements dealing with S&DT.106 While
there appeared to be general recognition of the problems developing
countries faced and an acknowledgment that S&DT was a central part of the
MTS,107 there was little commitment to broadening the concept of S&DT.
In the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations, the notion that developing
countries needed radically different treatment from those accorded
101. Breckenridge, supra note 10, at 4.
102. Youseff, supra note 14, at 1.
103. Michalopoulos, supra note 7, at 30.
104. Id. (explaining that there were two sets of problems).
105. See Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Punta del Este, Uruguay, Sept. 20, 1986 GATT B.I.S.D. (33rd Supp.) at 19-28 (1987).
Going into the Uruguay Round, negotiations aimed amongst other things at bringing about
"further liberalization and expansion of world trade to the benefit of all countries, especially less-
developed contracting parties. Article A(ii). A second goal was that negotiations would foster
"concurrent co-operative action at the national and international levels to strengthen the inter-
relationship between trade policies and other economic policies affecting growth and
development." Article A(iv).
106. Youssef, supra note 14, at 2 (stating, "The start' of the Uruguay Round... signaled the
beginning of a new phase which introduced some major changes regarding the issue of trade and
development, and the status of developing countries in the global trading system.").
107. WHALLEY, supra note 11, at 3. The Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round
Negotiations also dealt in part with issues of concern to developing countries. Specifically on
S&DT, contracting parties agreed that "the principle of differential and more favourable treatment
embodied in Part IV and other relevant provisions of the General Agreement applies to the
negotiation." See id. (noting that the preamble to most decisions contained a non-concrete
reference to SDT).
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developed countries changed. Consequently, the "major innovation arising
from the Uruguay Round negotiations was the adoption of identical
commitments applying to all members irrespective of their level of
development."108 The "Single Undertaking Approach," a guiding principle
of the Uruguay Round, also meant that all members were subject to the
same set of trade rules.
While S&DT in the pre-Uruguay Round period denoted both an access
and a right to protect,109 key features of the results of the Uruguay Round
negotiations included: (i) a shift in focus from development concerns to
implementation concerns;" 0 in other words, the emphasis was on ensuring
that developing countries implemented their commitments through the
provision of time extensions, technical assistance, and compensations;I'
(ii) erosion of the non-reciprocity principle and idea of special treatment; in
their place universality and mutuality of obligations and non-discrimination
were stressed; and (iii) new restrictions on the ability of developing
countries to adopt policies in furtherance of their national industrial
development objectives."l2 Overall, the Uruguay Round resulted in "a
major revision and roll-back of the traditional international development
agenda" of the global trading system. 13
1. Substantive Changes
S&DT provisions appear in virtually all the Uruguay Round
agreements. According to a December 2000 report by the WTO's
Committee on Trade and Development, these agreements house about 145
S&DT provisions; of these, 107 were adopted at the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round, and twenty-two apply to least-developed country Members
only.114 In terms of typology, the SDT provisions fall into six broad
categories: (i) provisions that are aimed at increasing trade opportunities for
108. Lichtenbaum, supra note 12, at 1013.
109. WHALLEY, supra note 11, at 3.
110. The single undertaking nature of the Uruguay Round agreements meant that developing
countries could not opt out of even those agreements they had no capacity to implement. In return
for their commitment to new disciplines, developed countries agreed to offer them more time and
technical support to implement their assumed obligations.
11. Id. at 13 (noting that the Uruguay Round SDT were offered as a response to perceived
special problems). New GATT/WTO disciplines posed, for developing countries in particular, the
problem of limited capacity to implement new disciplines.
112. Id.
113. Youssef, supra note 14, at 2.
114. World Trade Organization: Committee on Trade and Development, Implementation of
Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decision: Note by
Secretariat, WT/COMTD/W/77 (Oct. 25, 2000) [hereinafter Implementation of Special and
Differential Treatment] available at http://www.wto.org.
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developing countries; (ii) provisions that require WTO members to
safeguard the interest of developing country member; (iii) provisions that
allow developing country members some flexibility of commitments, in-
cluding flexibility in the use of domestic policy instruments; (iv) provisions
that pertain to transitional time periods; (v) provisions that provide for
technical assistance to developing countries; and (vi) provisions that relate
specifically to least developing country members of the MTS.115
A complete listing of all these S&DT provisions as they appear in these
agreements is beyond the scope of this article. In general, concessions to
developing countries were made in a broad range of issue areas, including
agriculture, technical barriers to trade, services, dispute settlement, and
subsidies/countervailing duties to mention a few.116 In this section, selected
S&DT provisions of Uruguay Round agreements will be discussed using
the six-fold taxonomy developed by the WTO Secretariat. I shall proceed
to briefly examine the key aspects of these provisions.
a. Provisions That Are Aimed at Increasing Trade
Opportunities for Developing Countries
Under this category, the most prominent and most controversial form
of S&DT are provisions that call for preferential access to developed
countries' market and specify actions to be taken by WTO members in
order to increase the trade opportunities available to developing
countries.117 Arrangements such as the generalized system of preferences
are covered under this heading, as are other measures aimed at increasing
trade opportunities for developing countries. These can be found in various
agreements including the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on
Textile and Clothing,ll8 and the General Agreement on Trade in
Services. 119
One problem with category (a) provisions is that most of the provisions
"are of a best endeavour nature." 120 The result, as the World Trade Report
2003 rightly noted, is that "while some countries have been able to make
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See generally GATT 1994 Art. XXXVI-XXXVIII.
118. See Agreement on Textile and Clothing, Article 2:8, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/16-tex-e.htm (last visited March 1, 2004).
119. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Article IV: 1 and Article IV:2, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/26-gats0 01.e.htm (last visited March 1, 2004).
120. WORLD TRADE REPORT, supra note 29, at 155.
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good use of preferences ... schemes like the GSP have been of limited
utility to most developing countries in terms of expanding their export."' 2'
b. Provisions That Require WTO Members to Safeguard the
Interest of Developing Country Members
These provisions concern either actions to be taken by WTO Members
or actions to be avoided by Members, in order to safeguard the interests of
developing country members of the WTO. These provisions can be found
in about thirteen different WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 (Part
IV), the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT),122 the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), the
Agreement on Textile and Clothing,123 and the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).124
c. Provisions That Allow Developing Country Members
Some Flexibility of Commitments, of Action, and Use of
Policy Instruments
These provisions specify actions that developing countries may
undertake through exemptions from GATT/WTO disciplines, exemptions
from commitments, or a reduced level of commitments developing
countries may choose to undertake when compared to Members in
general.125 They can be found in about nine different WTO agreements
including GATT 1994, the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment measures, and the DSU.
d. Provisions That Pertain to Transitional Time Periods
Provisions under this heading relate to time bound exemptions from
disciplines otherwise generally applicable. Provisions relating to
transitional time periods can be found in eight different WTO agreements,
including AOA, SPS, TBT, and TRIMS.126
121. Id.
122. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Article 10:6; 12:1: 12:2; 12:3; 12:5 12:8;
and 12:9, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/17-tbt-e.htm (last visited March
1,2004).
123. Agreement on Textile and Clothing, Article 6:6(b)-(c).
124. Understanding on Rules and Procedure Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Articles
8:10; 12:10; 12:11; 2:7 and 2:8, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/28-
dsue.htm (last visited March 29, 2004).
125. Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment, at para. 11.
126. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, at Art. 5.3.
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e. Technical Assistance Provision
These provisions carry with them the promise of technical assistance to
enable recipient countries implement the covered agreement. These can be
found in about six WTO agreements, including TBT,127 TRIPS128 and the
DSU.129
f. Provisions That Relate Specifically to Least Developed
Countries (LDCs)
The provisions are unique to the extent that their applicability are
limited exclusively to LDCs. Seven different agreements have provisions
available only to LDCs; these include TBT, TRIPS, AOA, DSU and GATS.
Overall, although the Uruguay Round agreements contain numerous
specific provisions in favor of developing countries, these are of a different
nature from those in force under GATT. For the most part, the new pro-
visions focus on problems associated with implementing the Uruguay
Round agreements rather than on the more important question of barriers to
products originating in developing countries and on the development
constraints to trade. 130 Emphasis is on granting developing countries
transitional periods and technical assistance to enable them "catch-up."
Questions also exist regarding the exact legal status of new S&DT
provisions. The result is lack of implementation of agreed provisions.131
2. Institutional Changes
The major institutional development that occurred between 1986 and
1995 was the establishment of the WTO. With the establishment of the
WTO came a more structured organ with powers to periodically review
trade policies of Member States and to adjudicate trade disputes between
states. The establishment of the WTO has affected discussions about
S&DT in two ways. First, the policies of developing countries are under
more intense scrutiny today; this means that deviations from trade rules are
127. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, at Art. 11:1-11:7, 12:7.
128. Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, Art. 47, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legale/27-trips_0 l-e.htm (last visited March 1, 2004).
129. Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment, at para. 15.
130. H. E. Jayen Krishna Cuttaree, Minister of Industry and International Trade
Mauritius, Rules Issues and Special and Differential Treatment, available at
http://www.dse.de/ef/wto02/cuttaree.htm (last visited March 29, 2004) (speaking at the
International Policy Dialogue: The Development Dimension of World Trade - Implementing the
Doha Development Agenda).
131. Id. (noting that provisions that encourage developed countries to promote and
encourage technical transfer to least developed countries such as Article 66.2 have "never been
meaningfully enacted).
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much more easily detected and that domestic policies are more susceptible
to external monitoring and supervision. Second, the establishment of a
strong dispute settlement mechanism means that developing countries that
violate global trade are more vulnerable to law suits via the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism. However, the establishment of a strong dispute set-
tlement mechanism also means that developing countries have more
opportunities to call for authoritative clarification of the content and
meaning of existing SDT provisions.
C. CONCLUSION
A major change in the concept of S&DT occurred in the course of the
Uruguay Round negotiations.132 Although there was an unequivocal
reaffirmation of S&DT as a principle of the MTS in the Punta del este
Declaration on the Uruguay Round Negotiations, in the course of the
negotiations the concept of S&DT "changed from a focus on preferential
access and special right to protect, to one of responding to special
adjustment difficulties in developing countries stemming from the im-
plementation of WTO decisions."1 33 Essentially, developing countries lost
the flexibilities and policy spaces based on their economic conditions that
they had hitherto enjoyed. 134 What they "gained" were promises of tech-
nical assistance, extension of time within which to comply with agreed
rules, and a few agreement-specific concessions. 135
Several reasons have been advanced to explain the pre-Uruguay Round
focus on preferential access and non-reciprocity and the radical changes that
132. World Trade Organization: Committee on Trade and Development, Special and
Differential Treatment Provisions: Joint Communication by the Least-Developed Countries,
TN/CTD/W/4, (May 24, 2002) at para. 7 (observing that the conclusion of the Uruguay Round led
to the erosion of the usefulness of most S&DT provisions, and that as it emerged under the
Uruguay Round Agreements, the S&DT afforded to developing countries was defined in
extremely limited ways) [hereinafter Joint Communication by the Least-Developed Countries];
WHALLEY, supra note 11, at 13-14; WORLD TRADE REPORT, supra note 29, at 153.
133. Proposal on a Framework Agreement, at para. 9 (noting that the Uruguay Round
Agreements shifted the thrust of S&DT from enhanced market opportunities to grant of transition
periods and technical assistance).
134. Michalopoulos, supra note 7, at 5. The policy flexibilities included the opportunity to
promote industrialization through import substitution, promote export through use of export
subsidies, and respond to balance of payment problems through trade controls. Id.
135. DOHA ROUND BRIEFING SERIES, supra note 5, at 1 (stating, "During the Uruguay
Round, the concept of S&DT changed from one of providing a range of flexibilities and additional
policy spaces based on economic criteria to one essentially consisting of time-limited derogations
from rules, with more favourable treatment regarding tariff and subsidy reduction commitments,
thresholds in the application of countervailing measures, and limited policy flexibility for specific
obligations"). WHALLEY, supra note 11, at 18 (noting that "the Uruguay Round decisions
were ... ad hoc, arrived at only late in the process, and lacked an integrated intellectual
structure").
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were introduced during the Uruguay Round. Five factors help explain the
gains that were made between 1947 and 1986: (a) guilt on the part of
erstwhile empires and sympathy for newly independent territories,136 (b)
prevailing consensus regarding the type of trade strategy best suited for
development,137 (c) impetus from the United Nations, 138 (d) a strong and
united negotiating strategy by developing countries, and (e) the politics of
the Cold War.
Regarding negotiation strategy, in the early days of GATT, developing
countries acted and were treated as one single negotiating block; many were
ex-colonies with common histories and similar experiences and
problems. 139 Presenting a united front made it easier for developing
countries to win concessions.
In terms of the trends in intellectual thought during this period, the
widely held belief in the 1950s and 1960s was that all developing countries
would inevitably face balance of payment problems as a result of their low
income status and because of the prevailing patterns of international
specialization.140 Excessive trade liberalization was thought to be bad for
developing countries as that would worsen their balance of payment
problems and fail to promote industrialization. 141 Consequently, protection
136. See generally Lichtenbaum, supra note 12. Many developing countries cast their
argument for special treatment in terms of their need to need to overcome their colonial legacy
and "catch-up" with their erstwhile colonial masters. In the 1950s and 1960s, the unequal position
of developing countries was directly linked to their legacy of colonial oppression. With the sores
of colonialism still fresh, it is possible that some concessions were made to developing countries
out of a sense of guilt. Lichtenbaum, supra note 12, at 1009 (noting that the principles of S&DT
emerged partly from the rhetoric of post-colonialism).
137. Trends in trade policy discussion during this period favoured market access for
developed countries and protection of developing countries market from stiff competition.
Intellectual thought during this report were strengthened by numerous studies and reports (for
example the 1958 Haberler Report) that upheld import substitution as the right development
model. The Haberler Report was produced by a panel of experts, chaired by Professor Gottfried
Haberler and established in 1955 to examine trends in international trade in light of the concerns
of developing countries about agricultural protectionism in developed countries and fluctuating
commodity prices.
138. Youseff, supra note 14, at 1, 9 (tracing the 1964 decision to add Part IV of GATT to the
first U.N. Conference on Trade and Development and noting that the initial pressures for reform
of the MTS to the U.N. "where developing countries found an appropriate political platform to air
their views and demands").
139. Id. at 4 (noting that because the number of developing countries in the GATT was
limited, it was not absurd to think of them as one single category). WHALLEY, supra note 11, at 6
(noting that developing countries had common problems and hence it was easy to negotiate as a
bloc).
140. Michaloupolos, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that in the 60s and 70s, developing countries
tended to specialize in raw materials, which were characterized by low price and income elasticity
of demand and considerable price volatility).
141. Id. at 4 (noting that in the 50s and 60s, it was felt that liberal trade policies would
stymie the development of infant industries and that continued dependence on primary products
would result in volatile export earnings and deteriorating terms of trade).
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of infant industry was seen as a sound strategy to avoid trade deficits and an
altogether desirable path to development.142
By contrast, by 1986, most of the factors that helped shape the
development of SDT provisions in the pre-Uruguay Round days had all but
disappeared. Factors that explain what some call the round-about stance
towards SDT include: a) the erosion of the U.N.'s role in the economic
sphere; 143 (b) shifts towards liberalization in the South;44 (c) the weakening
of collective action by the South and a changed negotiating strategy;14 5 (d)
changes in the global geopolitical and economic situation, including shifts
towards radical neoliberalism in the North,146 the pressure to expand trade
agenda, 147 the growing skepticism about the economic development
benefits of trade protection, 148 and overall change in trade policy discus-
sions away from import substitution and towards export orientation and full
liberalization. With respect to the latter, by 1980, intellectual thought had
moved away from protectionism towards outward orientation.149 As lib-
eralization became the hallmark of economic policies in the late seventies
and throughout the eighties, virtually every government, some under
142. Id. These beliefs were strengthened by the thesis of two noted economists: Singer and
Prebisch (Singer-Prebisch thesis). Both argued that developing countries faced a secular decline
in their terms of trade and called for preferential access to developed country markets for products
from developing countries.
143. Youssef, supra note 14, at 9.
144. Id.
145. Id. By the 1980s, the bloc wide negotiating strategy previously adopted by developed
countries began to unravel as the needs of developing countries changed and the nature of their
interest in international negotiation also changed. Increasingly, countries sought chose to pursue
country interest rather than bloc wide interest. Division within the ranks of developing countries
also emerged as developing countries began to oppose each other on certain subjects and as they
began to pursue unilateral liberalization. Additionally, some newly industrializing economies no
longer actively sought special treatments. For example, some countries in Asia and Latin America
enjoyed rapid growth in the 1970s and 1980s and with that succeeded in diversifying their
economies. They were no longer totally dependent on the export of a few agricultural products
and were in a better position to assume higher levels of commitment and to demand concessions.
WHALLEY, supra note 11, at 10.
146. WORLD TRADE REPORT, supra note 29, at 154. "The decade of the 1980s opened with
a significant realignment in economic thinking in some major economies, especially the United
States. This approach.., militated against government intervention and emphasized the role of
markets, including for development." Id.
147. Youssef, supra note 14, at 2.
148. Michalopoulos, supra note 7, at 5 (explaining that from the early 1970s and throughout
the decade, many had begun to question the effectiveness of infant industry protection as a vehicle
for industrialization and development). Many believed that trade barriers designed to protect
infant industries created disincentive to export and as a result, many infant industries remained
inefficient and failed to achieve export competitiveness.
149. WHALLEY, supra note 11, at 9. Two factors contributed to this shift in intellectual
thought. First was the enviable record of countries like Korea and Taiwan that had adopted
outward oriented strategies; to some economists, the record of these countries proved that outward
orientation works. Second was the apparent failure of protectionism in countries that had adopted
it. Id.
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pressure from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
began to adopt policies aimed at deregulation, privatization, and liber-
alization of investment and regimes.
III. FIFTY YEARS OF SDT: A CRITIQUE
The roll-back of the traditional development agenda and the erosion of
value of S&DT under the Uruguay Round agreements was not the only
problem developing countries had with the response to the development
question within GATT/WTO. Even before the Uruguay Round, developing
countries had serious problems with some of the provisions of GATT
relating to S&DT. Despite the growing number of S&DT provisions, on
the whole developing countries note that the operationalization and
implementation of S&DT provisions have been less than fully satisfied.
Going into the Uruguay Round negotiations, developed countries also had
problems with the way the concept of S&DT was applied in the system;
rather than foster integration of developing countries into the MTS, S&DT
appeared to be creating permanent exclusion or second tier membership in
the system.
In this section, I shall examine the perceived shortcomings of the
S&DT provisions. I shall also examine arguments that are frequently ad-
vanced for and against the continued use of the concept of S&DT in the
MTS.
A. THE PERCEIVED SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT S&DT PROVISIONS
The submissions by developing countries and LDC Members to the
WTO's Committee on Trade and Development identify a number of
weaknesses in current S&DT provisions. Top on the list of perceived short-
comings are: (i) the piecemeal approach to S&DT,50 (ii) the non-mandatory
nature of some provisions, (iii) the lack of effort to operationalize and
implement many of the provisions pertaining to SDT, (iv) the lack of
specificity as to how some provisions should be applied, (v) the over-rigid
nature of some provisions, 151 (vi) the general lack of coherence in global
economic policy-making, (vii) the behind-the-scene pressure on developing
countries to give up rights and policy flexibilities available under the WTO
agreements, (viii) the gradual erosion of the value of the S&DT provisions,
150. Id. at 12 (noting that although new arrangements in the name of S&DT were offered,
they were largely ad hoc in formalization and seemed little more than token compensation).
151. See generally World Trade Organization/ Committee on Trade and Development,
Special and Differential Treatment Provisions: Joint Communication from the Africa Group in the
WTO, TN/CTD/W/3/Rev. 2, (July 17, 2002) [hereinafter Joint Communication from the Africa
Group].
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and (ix) the general failure of most S&DT provisions to deliver the positive
effects intended. A few of these issues will be explored in this section.
1. S&DT Obligations: Non-Mandatory or "Best Endeavour"
Undertakings
Regarding the content, scope, and legal status of the SDT provisions,
confusion has prevailed. Many S&DT provisions are not binding on de-
veloped countries. 152 S&DT provisions are identified as binding in nature
where they use the word "shall" rather than "should."153 However, as the
WTO Secretariat readily admits, some S&DT provisions that are mandatory
in the strict legal sense of the term (i.e., the term "shall" is used) "are
nevertheless characterized by a considerable flexibility of the obligations
laid down in these provisions." 5 4 S&DT provisions also vary depending
on whether they require Members to achieve a certain result (obligation of
result), engage in a certain conduct (obligation of conduct),155 and on
whether they stipulate obligations that Members must take individually or
obligations that Members must take collectively.
The overall result is confusion about the legal status of most S&DT
provisions. Frequently, the language of the S&DT provisions merely en-
courage developed countries to help developing countries. For example,
Part IV of GATT existed only as a moral commitment, whose primary
significance lay in "its value as an agreed statement of principle."156 Part
IV was "never more than a set of 'best endeavour' undertakings with no
152. Lichtenbaum, supra notel2, at 1015 (noting that many S&DT provisions relating to
market access are "soft law," unenforceable through the dispute settlement process). Watal, supra
note 47, at 72 (noting with respect to the WTO agreements that "the clauses on special and
differential treatment incorporated in these agreements only give time derogation or call for "best
endeavor" type commitments"). See generally Gustavo Olivares, The Case for Giving
Effectiveness to GATT/WTO Rules on Developing Countries and LDCs, 35 J. OF WORLD TRADE
545 (2001).
153. See WTO/Committee on Trade and Development, Implementation of Special and
Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions: A Review of Mandatory
Special and Differential Treatment Provisions, WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev. 1/Add. 2, (Dec. 21,
2001) 4 [hereinafter Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment: A Review of
Mandatory Provisions].
154. See WTO/Committee on Trade and Development, Non-Mandatory Special and
Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements and Decisions: Note by the Secretariate,
WVT/COMTD/W/77/Rev. l/Add.3, (Feb. 4, 2002) at para. 4.
155. The distinction between "obligations of conduct" and "obligations of result" is not very
clear-cut. S&DT provisions that contain obligations of result "require Members to achieve a
certain outcome, but leave them free to choose appropriate means of achieving that result;" those
that lay down obligations of conduct "do not require Members to achieve any particular result, but
instead require them to adopt a certain course of conduct." Implementation of Special and
Differential Treatment: A Review of Mandatory Provisions, at 4.
156. CARL, supra note 57, at 83.
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legal force." 57 Today, Youssef notes that "its provisions are all but
forgotten," 58 and that aggressive supervision is constantly needed to ensure
that the contents are not further eroded.
2. Uncertainty/Use as a Threat
Developing countries continue to face serious market access problems
despite the existence of the GSP scheme. The GSP is granted by in-
dustrialized countries on a voluntary, unilateral, and non-binding basis.
This means that the preference-giving nation can amend, modify, or
withdraw benefits unilaterally. The voluntary and non-supervised nature of
the GSP is problematic on several levels. 59 First, at all times, the
"preference giving nations retain the right to select the beneficiary
countries; the products, as well as the quantities thereof; eligibility for such
treatment; and to impose various other conditions."160 Frequently, products
of interest to developing countries are excluded from the list of eligible
products.'61 Second, developed countries also have used the GSP as a
threat to achieve other goals;162 the United States, for example, has used it
to coerce countries into creating or adopting intellectual property laws
favourable to the United States. 63 Third, being a voluntary scheme, "it
meant that developing country suppliers had less certainty regarding market
conditions than under the contractual arrangements involving bound tariffs
in the GATT."164 Fourth, studies show that the benefits of GSP were and
still are concentrated on the more advanced countries-those who needed
157. WORLD TRADE REPORT, supra note 29, at 152; Lichtenbaum, supra note 12, at 1012
(noting that Part IV was hortatory for the most part).
158. Youssef, supra note 14, at 6.
159. CARL, supra note 57, at 86 (noting quite rightly that "the GSP really is not a
'generalized' system, but rather a cluster of national laws enacted by industrialized nations and
conceding preferential treatment to the developing countries").
160. Michalopoulos, supra note 7, at 11 (noting that the GSP was at best important for some
products, for some countries, and for some time).
161. Id. (noting that products such as textile and agriculture were either excluded or severely
limited). The exclusion of the agricultural sector from GATT disciplines has permitted developed
countries to constrain imports and subsidize exports at will.
162. Joint Communication from the African Group, at para. 6(a) (stating, "But it has been
common for governments to be prevailed upon to give up rights available or policy flexibility
under the WTO Agreements. In this regard, coherence in global economic policy making and
implementation would be necessary to ensure the use of the flexibility allowed developing and
least-developed countries").
163. Lichtenbaum, supra note 12, at 1015 (noting that under the United States law,
characteristics of the GSP include unilateralism, conditionality and the erosion of the articles
deemed "import sensitive").
164. Michaloupolos, supra note 7, at 11.
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them least.165 Overall, rather than limit, the GSP exacerbated the bar-
gaining power of major trading powers at the expense of the developing
countries and entrenched a system of preferences and discrimination on
tactical and political grounds.166
3. Lack of Implementation
Implementation issues currently dominate S&DT debates. Although
the Uruguay Round Agreements make allowance for the problems that
developing countries may face in their attempt to implement the agreements
through the grant of transition periods and promises of technical assistance,
serious problems have arisen. For example, although some transitional
periods have already expired, few developing countries have been able to
implement the agreements. Essentially, developing countries view the tran-
sitional periods as unrealistic and arbitrarily determined.167 As the Africa
Group has argued:
Transition periods ... for developing and least developed countries
have on the whole been inadequate. It is likely that this inadequacy has
resulted from the subjective or rather arbitrary manner the length of the
transition periods has been determined and the lack of proper programs de-
signed to phase in transition periods. 68
Developing countries want transitional periods to be determined in an
objective manner that relates to the actual process of adjustment 69 and also
want an automatic right to obtain extensions on transition periods.
Implementation issues also arise with respect to market access
commitments already accepted by developed countries. Developing coun-
tries believe that implementation issues related to agriculture and textile and
clothing have so far not been seriously addressed; they want further
reduction of domestic farm support, agricultural subsidies, and reduction of
agricultural tariffs.170
165. Id. (citing a study that showed that four countries-Brazil, Hong Kong, Korea and
Taiwan-derived more than fifty percent of all GSP benefits).
166. ISLAM, supra note 69, at 443 (arguing that "the GSP, the terms of which are dictated by
developed countries, has become yet another permissible means of extending Northern economic
leverage and pursuing strategic policy imperatives by excluding or threatening to exclude certain
third world countries from preferential access to markets").
167. Lichtenbaum, supra note 12, at 1019 (observing that developing countries view the
transitional periods as unrealistic and not commensurate with the concurrent need for capacity
building to implement the agreements).
168. Joint Communication from the Africa Group, at para. 6(c).
169. Id.
170. Haque, supra note 3, at 112-13 (noting that it is important to reexamine the
implementation issues related to the TRIPs agreement, services, agriculture, and textile and
clothing).
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4. Erosion of Value
Developing countries lament the gradual erosion of the value of S&DT
provisions.171 The erosion of value is particularly evident in the provisions
relating to preferential market access. 172 For example, the preferential tariff
margin they enjoyed under the GSP schemes have gradually evaporated as a
result of across-the-board reduction of the overall levels of tariff under the
Uruguay Round 173 and because of the increased use of non-tariff measures
by developed countries on products of interest to developing countries. 174
B. THE CASE FOR S&DT
The conceptual basis for S&DT hinge on the wide gap that currently
exists between the economic capacities and levels of development if dif-
ferent WTO members.175 S&DT would appear to be necessary as long as
there is a MTS made up of mismatched economic actors and countries at
vastly different levels of development.176
The development needs of developing countries and their lack of
administrative capacity to implement trade rules effective make S&DT
provisions very crucial.
As a result of their lower levels of development, developing countries
experience peculiar problems that constrain their beneficial participation in
the MTS. Fundamental to these problems "are structural imbalances in
their economies as well as distortions arising from historical trading
relations, both of which combine to undermine productive and trade ca-
pacity in these countries."1 77 It can be argued that because the direction of
causality between trade and income growth remains controversial, it is
important that developing countries have considerable flexibility in their
policy options. As the Africa Group has argued, "The development needs
of developing and least-developed country Members require special
171. Joint Communication by the Least-Developed Countries, at para. 7 (noting that with the
conclusion of the Uruguay Round, S&D came to consist overwhelmingly of time-limited
derogations from various multilateral trade agreements and equally limited specific measures).
172. Cuttaree, supra note 130, at 2 (observing that the waiver clause of the GATT have been
undermined and eroded). While under GATF there was considerable flexibility regarding use of
waiver, decisions on grant of waiver are more stringently monitored.
173. Lichtenbaum, supra note 12, at 1015 (observing that the economic benefits resulting
from preferential access elude developing countries as tariff barriers among industrialized nations
are waning); see also WHALLEY, supra note 11, at 26 (noting that special rights for developing
countries via GSP were first constrained in various ways and then weakened quantitatively by
multilateral tariff cuts).
174. Michalopoulos, supra note 7, at 10.
175. Youssef, supra note 14, at 4.
176. Id. at 3.
177. Joint Communication by the Least-Developed Countries, at para. 5.
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domestic policies, measures and laws as well as direct assistance for
enhanced access to global and regional markets, domestic implementation
of obligations, administrative and continuous compliance with obligations,
and enforcement of their rights under the agreements." 178
The high cost associated with integration is also a problem for most
developing countries. Integration into the MTS has a lot of implications for
a country's administrative and financial capacity. It demands that de-
veloping countries "comply with a number of policy prescriptions with far
reaching impacts, from restructuring their productive sectors to writing new
laws for patent protection, banking, taxation, investment deregulation,
labour, environment and social services." 179 Many developing countries
currently lack the institutional structures and capacities needed to
successfully integrate. 80 Resource constraints in the form of human, finan-
cial, and institutional shortfalls require technical, financial, and various
types of assistance to supplement domestic resources and establish or
strengthen domestic institutions.
Developing countries also increasingly argue that S&DT must not be
seen as charity but must be seen as part of their negotiated condition for
accepting additional obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreements and
the trade-off for perceived shortcomings in other negotiated agreements.' 8'
Additionally, they also argue that S&DT is necessary given the continued
protection of sectors of interest to developing countries by developed
countries. 182
C. THE CASE AGAINST S&DT
Among developed countries and some scholars, there is growing skep-
ticism about the potential benefits of S&DT.183 Developed countries also
178. Joint Communication from the Africa Group, at para. 16.
179. Shalmali Guttal, Shaping a Development Friendly Trade Agenda, at 1, available at
www.dse.de/ef/wto02/guttal.htm (last updated July 16, 2002).
180. Id. (noting that the institutional structures and capacities that enable advanced countries
to maximize gains and minimize risks from global economic trend took centuries to build up and
that to a considerable extent these advantaged were built by disadvantaging developing countries).
181. In retrospect, developing countries realize that they were losers in the Uruguay Round.
This perception arises partly "from the ... realization that they had accepted fairly weak
commitments in agriculture and textiles while making substantially stronger ones, especially in
new areas such as intellectual property." Watal, supra note 47, at 72.
182. Youseff, supra note 14, at 2 (noting that while developing countries are increasingly
having to liberalize and open up their economies, they have not been successful in penetrating
northern markets).
183. WHALLEY, supra note 11, at 11 (noting that many countries queried what S&DT had
gained developed countries in concrete policy and economic performance terms).
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fear that S&DT may result in the permanent exclusion of some countries or
create second tier membership in the WTO. 184
Given what appears to be a failure of S&DT to achieve concrete results
for developing countries' economies, many are increasingly questioning the
logic that market protectionism will ultimately result in economic growth
and development for developing countries. 185 The argument is that pro-
tectionism does not pay in terms of economic development benefits but
rather creates corruption and rent seeking behavior, and it can lead to
market concentration domestically. 186
The broad flexibility accorded to developing countries and the non-
reciprocity in the levels of protection is criticized on several grounds.
Lichtenbaum, for example, argues that as a result of the broad flexibility
and non-reciprocity principle, "developing countries have been unable to
obtain significant concessions on products of interest to them from
developed economies by failing to participate in the exchange of reciprocal
reductions in trade barriers." 87
IV. TOWARDS IMPROVEMENT IN THE SYSTEM: DOHA ROUND
AND BEYOND
In principle, the WTO is committed to the idea of special and
differential treatment for developing countries. In November 2001, trade
ministers launched a new round of global trade negotiations (the Doha
Development Agenda) that is expected to put development issues squarely
on the WTO agenda. The WTO Ministerial Declaration (Doha Decla-
ration) of November14, 2001 is indicative of the new openness towards
development questions in the WTO.188 Central in the Doha Declaration is
the need to address comprehensively the linkages between trade and de-
velopment.189 Addressing the widely held fear of a massive disengagement
184. World Trade Organization/ Committee on Trade and Development, The WTO Work
Programme on Special and Differential Treatment Some EU Ideas for the Way Ahead:
Communication from the European Communities, TN/CTD/W/20, (Nov. 20, 2002) para. 12(a)
[hereinafter Communication from the European Communities].
185. Lichtenbaum, supra note 12, at 1014 (noting that the principle of S&DT is criticized for
its lack of implementation and its failure to achieve concrete results for beneficiaries).
186. WHALLEY, supra note 11, at 10; see also Lichtenbaum, supra note 12, at 1018 (arguing
that protectionism allows "developing countries to distort domestic resource allocation and
encourage rent seeking and waste, as well as adversely impacting growth in productivity and
sustainable development").
187. Lichtenbaum, supra note 12, at 1017. He notes that industrialized countries have
consistently singled out textiles and agriculture, products of interest of to developing countries,
and subjected these sectors to extremely high import restrictions. Id. at 10 17-18.
188. See generally Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 40.
189. Id.
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from the multilateral trade system by developing countries, the world trade
ministers promised to address developing countries' interest in global trade,
particularly the problems in the agricultural sector and concerns about
S&DT provisions. The round of global trade negotiations launched in Doha
began in January 2002 and is scheduled to be concluded by January 1,
2005.
A. THE DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
In the Doha Declaration, WTO Members reaffirmed that "provisions
for special and differential treatment are an integral part of the WTO
agreements," 190 and they agreed that "all special and differential provisions
shall be reviewed with a view to strengthening them and making them more
precise, effective and operational."'91 In particular, trade ministers
expressed a commitment to "addressing the marginalization of least-
developed countries in international trade and to improving their effective
participation in the multilateral trading system."192 The Doha Ministerial
Declaration also noted that "[i]nternational trade can play a major role in
the promotion of economic development and the alleviation of poverty." 193
The Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns Decision of
November 14, 2001, also adopted during the fourth Ministerial Conference,
contains an elaborate work program on SDT.194 Paragraph 12 of the
Implementation Decision outlines four major prongs of work for the
Committee on Trade and Development (CTD). Paragraph 12 instructed the
CTD to accomplish the following: (i) "identify those special and differential
treatment provisions that are already mandatory in nature and those that are
non-binding in character;" (ii) "consider the legal and practical implications
for developed and developing Members of converting special and
"We recognize the need for all our peoples to benefit from the increased opportunities
and welfare gains that the multilateral trading system generates. The majority of WTO
members are developing countries. We seek to place their needs and interests at the
heart of the World program adopted in this Declaration .... We are committed to
addressing the marginalization of least-developed countries in international trade ......
Id. at paras. 2-3.
With these and many other laudable words, world trade ministers launched the "Development
Round" of multilateral trade negotiations. Id. The words represented both an admission of
centuries of imbalance in the global trading system and a commitment to effectively address the
marginalization of developing countries in international trade.
190. Id. at para. 44.
191. Id. (emphasis added).
192. Id. at para. 3.
193. Id.at para. 2.
194. World Trade Organization, Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns (Decision of
14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/17, (Nov. 20, 2001).
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differential treatment measures into mandatory provisions, [and] identify
those that Members consider should be made mandatory;" (iii) "examine
additional ways in which special and differential treatment provisions can
be made more effective;" (iv) consider ways "in which developing
countries, in particular the least-developed countries, may be assisted to
make best use of special and differential treatment provisions;" and (v)
"consider, in the context of the work program adopted at the Fourth Session
of the Ministerial Conference, how special and differential treatment may
be incorporated into the architecture of WTO rules." The CTD was
expected to report to the General Council by July 2002. The Trade
Negotiation Committee (TNC), under the authority Of the General Council,
had the overall responsibility to supervise all negotiations. 95 In 2002, the
TNC decided that the S&DT mandate would be handled in the Special
Sessions of the CTD.
To many observers, a significant change in global trade arrangements
occurred in Doha. Essentially, the Doha Declaration recognized the need to
address the concerns of developing countries and established an elaborate
work program to ensure that these concerns are addressed.196 According to
Michael Moore, former Director-General of the WTO, "Doha was a wakeup
call not just for the WTO, but for the international community as a whole
that it cannot be business as usual in the treatment of trade and development
issues."' 197 This view was echoed by H.E. Ms. Amina Chawahir
Mohammed, permanent Representative of Kenya to the WTO. According
to Ambassador Mohammed, "Doha marked a turning point in international
195. Doha Ministerial Declaration, at para. 46. The Trade Negotiation Committee was
mandated to hold its first meeting no later than January 31, 2002 and required to establish
appropriate negotiating mechanisms as required and supervise the progress of the negotiation.
196. See H. E. Amir Khosru Mahmud Chowdhury, Minister for Commerce, Government of
the People's Republic of Bangladesh, The Development Dimensions of World Trade, available at
http://www.dse.de/ef/wto02/mahmudl.htm (last visited March 29, 2004) (speaking at the
International Policy Dialogue: The Development Dimension of World Trade - Implementing the
Doha Development Agenda); see also http://www.dse.de/ef/wto02/ind0602e.htm (last visited
March 29, 2004)
(noting that the Doha Declaration recognized the role of enhanced market access, technical
assistance, and capacity building programs for ensuring the growth of LDCs and developing
countries). But see Guttal, supra note 179, at para. 13-14 (arguing that it is erroneous to call the
work plan that emerged from the Doha meeting a "development agenda because there was no
reciprocity in the Doha negotiations in terms of including items of interest to developing
countries).
197. World Trade Organization/ Committee on Trade and Development, Pledging
Conference for the Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund - Coherence, Technical
Assistance and Capacity Building - Report by the Secretariat - Revision, WT/COMTD/37/Rev.
1., (June 27, 2002) at 61 [hereinafter Pledging Conference].
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economic relations."198 William Kerr has also argued that at the Doha
meeting, the GATT/WTO was transformed from a club into an inclusive
organization that encouraged the active participation of all its members and
that major trading nations "no longer control the agenda-making and the
negotiation process."199 However, the representatives of many developing
countries are skeptical about the promises of Doha;200 many now wonder
whether the Doha Declaration deserved the praise it initially got or whether
it is a major disappointment. 201
B. BREAK-DOWN OF DOHA NEGOTIATIONS
Two years after the Doha Ministerial Conference, there are troubling
signs of a major crisis in the global trading system as key deadlines for
negotiations on S&DT have fallen by the wayside.202 An initial deadline of
December 31, 2002 (itself an extension of a missed July 31 deadline)
passed without any meaningful report from the Committee on Trade and
Development. 203 The deadline was extended to February 10, 2003, but as
of February, members were still unable to agree on any recommendations
for a decision. 204 Indeed, in February 2002, talks on S&DT ground to a
complete halt. Although the Chairman of the General Council circulated an
approach paper on April 8, 2003,205 which suggested a fresh approach to the
198. Id. (noting also that "[flor the first time, WTO members committed themselves to
unprecedented support and technical assistance for the integration of developed countries and least
developed countries into the evolving MTS").
199. Kerr, supra note 8, at 1, 4.
200. Haque, supra note 3, at 1101 (noting that the Pakistani's WTO ambassador was plainly
disappointed with the outcome of the Doha meeting).
201. Id. at 1101-02 (stating, "Does the outcome at Doha really signify a recaptured
momentum towards multilateralism in global trade or is it just business as usual in an
asymmetrical world? Do we really see a glimmer of hope or just a chimera?").
202. See Special and Differential Treatment: Putting Development Back in the Doha
Agenda, 7(3) Bridges 1 (2003) available at http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/bridges/BRIDGES7-
3.pdf (stating that "[o]ne after the other key deadlines in the multilateral negotiations launched in
November 2001 have fallen by the wayside").
203. The CTD was expected to report to the General Council on progress made in the
negotiations by July 31, 2002. Such a report was expected to include clear recommendations for a
decision. In July, the General Council instructed the CTD to "proceed expeditiously to fulfill its
mandate" and to report to the General Council "with clear recommendations for a decision by 31
December 2002." See Bridges, Vol 6, No. 41 at 1; DOHA ROUND BRIEFING SERIES, supra note 5,
at 1.
204. DOHA ROUND BRIEFING SERIES, supra note 5, at 1; see also WTO, Committee on Trade
and Development Special Session, Moving Forward on Proposals: Submission by Canada,
TN/CTD/W/22 (Dec. 5, 2002) (noting with respect to negotiations on S&DT, "a side that feels
obliged to oppose many proposal that seek to alter agreements and obligations absent rigorous
analysis") [hereinafter Submission by Canada].
205. See General Council Chairman's Proposal on an Approach for Special and Differential
T r e a t m e n t , 7 April 2003, JOB(03)/68, available at
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work on agreement specific proposals, little progress has been made ever
since.
At the beginning of September 2003, members remained at odds over
both substance and process. 206 Any hope that the WTO's Fifth Ministerial
Conference in Cancun would offer guidance on how to put the negotiations
back on track evaporated when developed countries walked out of the
Cancun meeting. Today, few believe that negotiations would be completed
by the January 31, 2004 deadline for concluding negotiations.
The problem is that sufficient convergence has not been achieved on
most of the issues under discussion. As might be expected, the divergence
is between mostly developed countries and most of the developing coun-
tries, and the arguments center around how to deal with the eighty-five-plus
proposals that have been submitted by WTO members. 207 Where are the
fault lines drawn? There are at least three contentious issues. First, mem-
bers disagree on the precise scope of the mandate of the Special Session of
the CTD on the S&DT question. Second, members disagree on which pro-
posals-agreement-specific proposals or crosscutting issues-should have
priority in the negotiations. Third, there is also serious disagreement on the
form, content, and structure of a monitoring mechanism for S&DT
provisions.
1. Scope of the Mandate of the CTD Special Session
Regarding the scope of the mandate on S&DT, members construe the
mandate differently. Developing countries argue that operationalizing and
strengthening S&DT provisions as called for in the Doha Declaration
requires the CTD to propose changes to the text of the WTO agreements
relating to S&DT that will have the effect of converting the non-binding
provisions into binding provisions. 208 To these countries, the changes that
the Doha Declaration calls for cannot be viewed as new negotiations
warranting intense negotiations and tradeoffs in other sectors but must be
seen as attempts at making effective previous negotiations. 209
http://www.ictsd.org/issarea/development/resources/Latest-SDT-proposals.pdf (last visited March
30, 2004).
206. See generally ICSTD, S&D 'Early Harvest': The 'Development' Agenda in Action?,
7(30) BRIDGES 1 (Sept. 4, 2003), available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-09-04/story3.htm
(last visited March 30, 2004).
207. Id.
208. Joint Communication from the Africa Group, at para. 7 (stating, "The non binding
provisions need to be made binding in order to provide some means and improve prospects for
securing their implementation. The mandatory obligations need to be highlighted so that they can
be implemented immediately and unconditionally").
209. Id. at para. 4.
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Developed countries construe the Doha Declaration mandate
differently. Essentially, developed countries argue that significant language
changes can only occur in the context of fresh negotiations, which they
believe is outside the jurisdiction of the CTD Special Session. 210 They
argue that proposals calling for change in the text should be handled by the
subsidiary body responsible for the issue area of each respective
proposal. 21l Developed countries also resist any change in the text of
S&DT provisions that would fundamentally alter the balance of Members
rights' and obligations. Unfortunately, a CTD report of February 10, 2003
to the General Council requesting that the General Council provide
clarification on the S&DT mandate of the Doha Declaration was not
adopted by the General Council, much to the disappointment of developing
countries. 212
2. Agreement-Specific Proposals vs. Cross-Cutting Issues
Regarding the tension between agreement-specific proposals and cross-
cutting proposals, developed countries want a detailed discussion on the
broader principles and objectives of S&DT before consideration of the
eighty-five-plus proposals submitted to the CTD.213 The argument is that
the WTO work program on S&D treatment could benefit from greater
structure and focus if there was agreement on a set of guidelines to be used
to test specific proposals. 214 Overall, developed countries believe that
crosscutting issues, such as those relating to qualification for S&DT
210. DOHA ROUND BRIEFING SERIES, supra note 5, at 2. Communication from the European
Communities, at para. 15(g).
211. Communication from the European Communities, at paras. 4, 15 (stating, "The
European Union (EU) agrees on the CTD monitoring and guiding discussions, while noting that
the relevant subject-committees may be the best place to consider the specificities of individual
S&D treatment proposals. S&D treatment proposals for which negotiating groups exist should...
be examined in the first place in those groups"); see also Submission by Canada, supra note 204
(stating, "Canada and a number of other countries have objected to proposals that call for
automatic self-granted extensions, open-ended financial obligations, and text changes where no
problem has been clearly demonstrated").
212. Given intractable differences over the proposals for reform and intense contestation
about the scope of the mandate of the CTD, developing countries thought it appropriate that
further clarification be sought. Some developed countries, in particular the United States and the
European Union, thought differently. Different reasons have been advanced for why the United
States and the European Union dismissed the idea of seeking clarification. It has been suggested
that these countries thought that seeking such a clarification would set a bad precedent in the
WTO. DOHA ROUND BRIEFING SERIES, supra note 5, at 2.
213. Id. at 3.
214. Communication from the European Communities, at para. 2 (stating, "To make
progress, Members could work on the basis of a set of S&D treatment principles or guidelines that
could be used to test specific S&D treatment proposals already on the table and serve as a
reference when S&D treatment is addressed in the negotiations").
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benefits and criteria for countries to "graduate" out of S&DT benefits,
should be addressed first.215
Developing countries interpret the Doha mandate differently; they want
the eighty-five-plus agreement-specific proposals to be addressed before the
more controversial crosscutting issues are taken up.2 16 Indeed, some argue
that examination of the cross-cutting issues is not part of the mandate of the
CTD.
3. Monitoring Mechanism?
There is also a divergence of opinion on the question of establishing a
monitoring mechanism for S&DT provisions. 217  While there is an
agreement on the broad idea of establishing a monitoring mechanism,
parties disagree on the nature of the mechanism. Countries like the United
States, Canada, and members of the European Union want the monitoring
mechanism to be established before further discussions on the Agreement-
specific proposals are taken up. They also have an ambitious mandate for
this mechanism. Such a mechanism would be responsible for monitoring
the effectiveness of S&DT provisions in the MTS, monitoring and reporting
on the work of various bodies that have the mandate to review the S&DT
provisions, and ensuring effective relations between the WTO and
international organizations such as UNCTAD and the World Bank.218
Developing countries want a mechanism to be established and first put
forth a proposal for such a mechanism. However, they fear that the moni-
toring mechanism may become a poor substitute for the Special Session of
the CDT, the body that has the actual mandate to review current S&DT
provisions.
Three other factors account for the relative lack of progress on the
S&DT negotiations. First, with changes in the global trading system, the
subject of S&DT has become fairly complex and detailed;219 it is therefore
understandable that members need more time to consider the effects of the
eighty-five-plus proposals made. Second, Members have been reluctant to
agree to changes where these would entail changes in the WTO agreements
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. The idea of a monitoring mechanism came from a proposal by the Africa Group. See
generally World Trade Organization/Committee on Trade and Development, Special and
Differential Treatment Provisions - Joint Communication from the African Group in the WTO,
TN/CTD/W/3 (May 24, 2002).
218. Id.
219. Communication from the European Communities, at para. 10 (noting that the subject "is
fairly complex and detailed, and Members need more time to consider the economic and legal
effects of the large number of proposals made").
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and carry major systemic implications. 220 hird, the question of causation
has not been fully established; in order words, in the absence of detailed
systematic study, it is difficult to sort out which problems are attributable to
shortcomings in S&DT provisions and which are attributable to other
factors such as domestic policy shortcomings. 221
V. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT: THE WAY
FORWARD?
In the 1960s and 1970s, many developing countries acceded to the
GATT in part as a result of the prestige that was associated with
membership. 222 Although the concessions that were required from GATT
membership was well beyond what was politically feasible for many de-
veloping countries, membership was nevertheless seen as a good thing.
Once inside the "club," developing countries sought special rights. Al-
though they got the special protective rights sought, developing countries
paid a price for this privilege; S&DT inevitably resulted in membership
hierarchies within the MTS.223
A lot has changed since the 1960s and 1970s when the concept of
S&DT was first introduced. On the one hand, many developing countries
have abandoned the protectionist strategies of the 1960s and 1970s and are
seeking more meaningful participation in the MTS. On the other hand, de-
veloped countries are beginning to demand major concessions from
developing countries.2 24 The deepening of commitments in the MTS and
the extension of rule making into new areas, such as services, tele-
communications, and intellectual property, has also changed the setting
within which S&DT operates. Furthermore, developing countries no longer
constitute a homogenous group but represent countries at different levels of
development that have attained varying levels of integration into the MTS.
Developing countries vary widely in terms of their income level, their size,
and their administrative capacities, such that a one-size-fits-all approach to
220. Id. at para. 10(c) (noting that some proposals "would entail major changes in WTO
Agreements, and in many cases carry major systemic implications. Such proposals may therefore
need to be considered in the context of the wider negotiating process").
221. Id. at para. 10(b).
222. Kerr, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that "[m]embership in the GATT became desirable not
so much for the benefit arising from the impure public goods but rather from the prestige that was
associated with it").
223. Id. (observing that "[tihe implicit compromise reached was that developing countries
would allow the existing developed-country members to control the negotiating agenda so that the
original, albeit evolving, political compromise remained intact").
224. Id. at 5.
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S&DT may no longer be appropriate or effective. Yet, there are dangers in
allowing differentiation among developing countries in relation to S&DT.
Given the changing dynamics of the global trading system, what are the
dangers of insistence on S&DT? There is the danger that the WTO may be
diverted "from its main task of making trade rules and redirected towards
other endeavors such as promoting international development." 225 There is
also the danger that if developed countries perceive that the organization no
longer serves their interest, they may abandon the organization al-
together.226 If Kerr is right in his conclusion that "[dieveloping countries
have a great deal to gain from the WTO but only if major trading countries
remain committed to it,"227 then developing countries must be careful about
the demands they make on the system. Any sweeping departure from the
fundamental principles embodied in the WTO would be unacceptable to
most developed countries.228
Abandon the MTS? Perhaps not. For many developing countries,
defensive isolation is no longer a feasible or realistic option. There is
nothing inherently wrong about external trade. 229 Uhder fair market
conditions, trade "allows a country to specialize in the productive activities
that it does relatively better than others, and thus export comparative
advantage." 230 External trade can yield huge financial benefits and, com-
pared to development aid, is a more efficient engine of poverty reduction. 231
Moreover, the increasing inter-dependence among nations means that
disengagement from the global trading system may not be in the interest of
poor countries; arguably, the needs of weak economies have the best chance
of being met in a multilateral setting. Participation in the MTS also
"obviates the need for entering into a series of bilateral agreements with
225. Id. at 6.
226. Id. at 7.
227. Id.
228. World Trade Organization/ Committee on Trade and Development, Special Session on
Special and Differential Treatment: Communication from Switzerland to the CTD in Special
Session. TN/CTD/W/14, (Sept. 13, 2002) at para. 3 (warning that while WTO rights and
obligations should not impede development, S&DT provisions are not meant to set aside the
common rules of the system or create a two-tier trading system, and that any sweeping departures
from the fundamental rules of the system would not be desirable).
229. Youssef, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that there are numerous benefits to be gained by
engaging in international trade).
230. WORLD TRADE REPORT, supra note 29, at 89. OXFAM, supra note 49, at 24.
[I1nternational trade can act as a force for good, or for bad. Trade rules can be designed to
disadvantage the poor and concentrate benefit in the hands of the rich, or they can be designed to
create an enabling environment in which poor countries can catch up with the rest of the world.
Id.
231. OXFAM, supra note 49, at 8.
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various countries and renewing them from time to time." 232 Finally, a
multilateral dispute settlement system affords protection to weak countries
by precluding unilateral actions by powerful countries.2 33
However, the fact that more than fifty years after the inception of the
MTS, there is still much confusion as to how to address the development
concerns of poorer countries is a cause for concern. The disappointing
outcomes associated with expansion of global trade under conditions of
intense globalization point to problems with past and present rules that
structure the global trading system. The vulnerability of the agricultural
sector in the global economy, shrinking market share for goods originating
in developing countries, crisis in the commodity markets (seen in the steady
decline in the prices of primary commodities), 234 barriers to goods from
developing countries, and the market dominance of transnational cor-
poration 235 are a few of the factors that currently account for the gap
between theory and practice.
Abandon S&DT? No! "One of the most important outcomes of the
Doha Ministerial," H.E. Mr. Kare Bryn, Ambassador, Permanent
Representative of Norway to the WTO, rightly notes, "was the recognition
that the developing countries, and especially the least developed countries,
need to draw larger benefits from increased opportunities and welfare gains
that the multilateral trading system generates." 236 No one doubts that the
system of S&DT is in need for urgent reform; the question is how to
fashion global trade rules for a system that is made up largely unequal
trading partners.
First, it is important to determine whether problems identified are
attributable to shortcomings in S&DT provisions or whether they are due to
other factors, such as domestic policy shortcomings or weaknesses in-
hibiting developing countries' fuller integration into the trading system.237
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Because many of the world's poorest countries are heavily dependent on primary
commodities for their foreign exchange earnings, crisis in the commodity market has serious
implications for the survival and welfare of many in the Third World. Oxfam estimates that more
than fifty developing countries depend on three primary commodities. Crisis in the commodity
market include fall in market prices a product of structural oversupply. Because output exceeds
demands, this leads to excessive stocks and price collapse. With respect to coffee, for example,
prices "have fallen by 70 per cent since 1997, costing developing-country exports some $8bn in
lost foreign-exchange earnings." OXFAM, supra note 49, at 13.
235. Transnational corporations (TNCs) are not new arrivals on the international stage.
Indeed, since "the days of the East India Company in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
private firms have been the main link between producers in the developing world and consumers
in the industrialized world." Id. at 42.
236. Pledging Conference, at 72.
237. Communication from the European Communities, at para. 10.
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Second, it is important that Members agree on a set of overriding principles
about the goals of special and differential treatment in global trade. 238
Third, it is important that critical issues, such as market access for goods
from developing countries, are urgently examined and meaningfully
addressed. Oxfam estimates that "if developing countries increased their
share of world export by just five percent, this would generate $350bn -
seven times as much as they receive in aid." 239 Because many of the
world's poorest countries are heavily dependent on primary commodities
for their foreign exchange earnings, crisis in the commodity market and
barriers to products of interest to developing countries in industrialized
countries' markets have serious implications for Third World economies. 240
In the long term, there is need to continue to probe the trade theory that
is used to support the pursuit of trade liberalization, 24' review the processes
by which negotiations are conducted in the WTO and its impact on de-
veloping countries, 242 consider the obstacles to effective participation in
WTO negotiations and processes that developing countries face, 243 examine
the reasons for the inability of developing countries to fully utilize the
dispute settlement system, and identify the totality of the implementation
problems developing countries face owing to their lower levels of
development.
Meaningful integration of developing countries, particularly LDC, into
the trading system and the global economy requires a committed effort by
all WTO members and the support of the global trade and finance
institutions.244 In the spirit of the Doha Declaration, under which members
committed themselves to "consider additional measures for progressive
238. Id. at para. 10(d) (lamenting that "Members have not so far established any clear
approach that can help us either to evaluate the merits of individual proposals, or give direction
and a sense of shared objectives in the process as a whole").
239. OXFAM, supra note 49, at 8.
240. Id. at 13.
241. Youssef, supra note 14, at 2. It is generally assumed that international trade promotes
efficiency by exploiting comparative advantage. The prediction frequently is that trade
liberalization will result in a win-win situation for all participants. Youssef, however, notes that
"market failures, imperfect competition, underdeveloped infrastructure and different levels of
human and technological resources challenge the assumptions of the simple theoretical models
and its predictions. Id.
242. The question to ask is, do the process of negotiation in the WTO work to the
disadvantage of developing countries and why? What practical disadvantage do developing
countries face in trade negotiations as a result of major disparities in power between developed
and developing countries? Why do negotiated results frequently reflect the interest of the more
powerful members of the WTO?
243. Youssef, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that due to "the high cost of maintaining an
adequate-size delegation to deal with trade matters" and their lack of skilled personnel, the modus
operandi of the WTO pose serious practical obstacles to effective participation).
244. Doha Ministerial Declaration, at para. 42.
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improvement in market access for LDCs,"245 the objective of duty-free,
quota-free market access for products originating from LDCs should be
embraced by all members of the WTO, particularly the industrialized
countries.
Today, the legal basis for S&DT provisions in trade agreements is
firmly established. Formal recognition of the needs and problems of
developing countries in the MTS is not new but goes back over half a
century. Moreover, at Doha, Ministers unequivocally endorsed the concept
of S&DT, thus providing a firm foundation for any serious work in the
future directed at realizing the full potential of S&DT. Nevertheless,
several questions still remain to be answered. First, is there still a good
case for S&DT? Second, should S&DT be universalized (made applicable
to all developing countries) or should it be based on some system of
differentiation? Third, what obligations, if any, should be imposed on
developing countries that choose to avail themselves of S&DT provisions in
present and future trade agreements? Fourth, what type of actions will
make a real difference to developing countries, particularly, least-
developing countries?
Regarding the first question, some of the original rationales for S&DT
remain very valid today. Moreover, the introduction of non-trade issues in
multilateral trade negotiations now makes it all the more imperative that
developing countries retain some flexibility in their policy options.
Additionally, an effective S&DT is necessary if the WTO is to regain the
public confidence it had lost and address the crisis of legitimacy it currently
faces. However, while there is a good case for S&DT, to make it a more
effective instrument of integration and development some changes are
warranted.
The second question touches on a very sensitive subject, that is, the
issue of which countries should be eligible for S&DT and how eligibility
should be defined. It is very important that S&DT is targeted to countries
that need it most; some system of tiering will therefore be inevitable in the
future. There is a need to go beyond the current narrow categorization of
developing countries in the MTS. In order words, the current distinction
between developing and least-developing countries is very narrow and
ignores the vast difference that exists among the different developing coun-
tries that make up the MTS. Tiering is obviously a very sensitive and divi-
sive subject that must be handled carefully; it must be based on an
objective, clearly definable, and manageable standards.
245. Id.
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Regarding obligations that may be reasonably imposed on developing
countries in relation to S&DT, several points could be made. The WTO is
not a development institution. Consequently, in the future developing
countries will have to critically evaluate and prioritize the demands they
make on the MTS. The expertise and resources needed to build the frame-
works necessary for sustainable development is beyond the capacity of the
WTO. Developing countries must therefore continue to engage other
development agencies and international institutions. It is also the re-
sponsibility of developing countries, in cooperation with all development
partners including the WTO, to meaningfully address supply-side con-
straints to development and integration into the global trading system.
Corruption, lack of policy directions, and inadequate support has led to
agricultural underproduction in many developing countries and must be
urgently addressed. At present, few developing countries have clearly de-
fined sustainable development objectives. It is the primary responsibility of
developing countries to adopt sound policies that can stimulate growth,
diversification, and competitiveness. However, global trade rules must af-
ford governments considerable policy autonomy and must not constrict
spaces for development. Finally, in the future, a system of periodic review
of the actions taken by developing countries in relation to S&DT may be
necessary. Given the underlying premise for S&DT, it may be necessary to
institute a system of review to evaluate the degree of utilization of S&DT
provisions by individual Members and the totality of factors (internal as
well as external) that determine the level of benefits a Member derives from
given S&DT provisions. In this regard, a level of transparency and
accountability on the part of developing countries will be necessary.
What conclusions then? First, S&DT must be seen as a tool for
development (helping developing countries achieve economic development
objectives) as well as a tool for adjustment and integration (helping to
bringing about the full integration of developing countries in the MTS).
One of the underlying purposes of S&DT must be to provide a broad
framework for development in the context of trade. As a tool for de-
velopment, the structure of present trade agreements must be reexamined.
Unless the underlying trade rules are fair and equitable, successful
integration into the MTS may not necessarily bring about desired economic
development. As a tool for development, S&DT provisions relating to
market access deserve urgent attention as do some major imbalances in
existing WTO agreements. Export subsidies and domestic support policies
of developed countries, as well as tariff-peaks and tariff-quotas applied to
products originating in developing countries and destined for developed
countries' markets, must also be addressed. Other barriers that arise as a
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result of the application of rules relating to technical barriers to trade and
sanitary and phytosanitary measures must be addressed as well. There is
also a need to examine and identify provisions of existing agreements that,
directly or indirectly, pose obstacles to development. In the final analysis, a
good faith review of existing S&DT provisions may require modification of
the provisions of some existing trade agreements.
Second, there is a need for coherence within the WTO and between all
agencies and institutions concerned about the position of developing
countries in the MTS. Because S&DT is but one of numerous methods
available in the MTS for protecting development interests in trade,
coherence in the rules and policies of the global trading system is of critical
importance. Although the WTO is the focal point of discussions on trade
and development, a host of other agencies (bilateral and regional) and
multilateral institutions (e.g., World Bank and IMF) are necessarily
implicated. Consequently, coherence between all the relevant agencies is
very important.
Third, although the idea of a proposed "Framework Agreement on
S&DT" is interesting, whether such an agreement will bring about greater
protection of the development interests of developing countries in the MTS
is debatable. The problem with current S&DT provisions is not so much
the absence of a framework agreement as the lack of commitment on the
part of important stakeholders. Fashioning such an agreement could also be
time-consuming and could detract attention from more important issues.
Nevertheless, a framework agreement could provide needed guidance and
coherence for future action on the S&DT; such an agreement could provide
guidance on the criterion against which present and future S&DT
provisions must be evaluated.
Fourth, equally interesting is the idea of an S&DT monitoring
mechanism. However, unless there is clear agreement on the SD&T rules
that are appropriate for development, the effectiveness of such a monitoring
mechanism will be minimal. In the event that WTO Members decide to
establish such a mechanism, it is important that the role of such a body be
clearly defined and its modus operandi carefully decided.
Fifth, unless key S&DT provisions are binding and made enforceable
through the dispute settlement system, effort directed at strengthening the
existing S&DT provisions as mandated by the Doha Declaration would be
meaningless. At present, large areas of global trade rules and policies lack
legally enforceable S&DT provisions. However, not all S&DT provisions
in existing trade agreements can be legally binding. For example, it is dif-
ficult to see how commitments of monetary support and promises of
technical assistance by developing countries can be made mandatory.
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Finally, in the future, developing countries owe it to themselves to
effectively employ their negotiating capital. Countries may be better off
refraining from ratifying onerous trade agreements than ratifying it and
subsequently calling for S&DT provisions. Negotiating capital is better ex-
pended obtaining firm concessions relating to market access from
developed countries than seeking expanded S&DT, particularly when the
SD&T provisions are time-bound and limited to adjustment. Trade ne-
gotiations must therefore be approached with a view to producing rules that
support sustainable development.
In conclusion, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of past and present
S&DT provisions cannot just be assumed but must be assessed in specific
cases and in relation to specific countries and regions. The future of S&DT
in the multilateral trading system will depend not on the paper promises of
the Doha Declaration but on the demonstrated commitment of WTO
Members, particularly advanced countries, to bring about genuine change in
the MTS; good faith political compromises will be needed. Bearing in
mind that a sound liberalization policy is not a substitute for a sound
development policy, S&DT must address both the development needs and
integration needs of developing countries. This calls for a reform of the
overall system of S&DT as well as reform of specific S&DT provisions in
existing trade agreements. Although on paper the Doha Declaration put
economic development at the heart of the agenda of the multilateral trading
system, the true test of the Doha Declaration will depend on how seriously
WTO Members take development concerns and the willingness of
developed countries to make meaningful concessions in critical areas of
trade negotiation.
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